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Abstract
The formation and stability of social hierarchies is a question of general relevance. Here,
we propose a simple generalized theoretical model for establishing social hierarchy via
pair-wise interactions between individuals and investigate its stability. In each interac-
tion or fight, the probability of “winning” depends solely on the relative societal status of
the participants, and the winner has a gain of status whereas there is an equal loss to the
loser. The interactions are characterized by two parameters. The first parameter repre-
sents how much can be lost, and the second parameter represents the degree to which
even a small difference of status can guarantee a win for the higher-status individual.
Depending on the parameters, the resulting status distributions reach either a continuous
unimodal form or lead to a totalitarian end state with one high-status individual and
all other individuals having status approaching zero. However, we find that in the latter
case long-lived intermediary distributions often exist, which can give the illusion of a sta-
ble society. As we show, our model allows us to make predictions consistent with animal
interaction data and their evolution over a number of years. Moreover, by implementing
a simple, but realistic rule that restricts interactions to sufficiently similar-status individ-
uals, the stable or long-lived distributions acquire high-status structure corresponding
to a distinct high-status class. Using household income as a proxy for societal status in
human societies, we find agreement over their entire range from the low-to-middle-status
parts to the characteristic high-status “tail”. We discuss how the model provides a con-
ceptual framework for understanding the origin of social hierarchy and the factors which
lead to the preservation or deterioration of the societal structure.
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1 Introduction
Animals, including humans, form social hierarchies [1–5]. How these hierarchies form
and what makes them remain stable over time is a central question across many different
fields. In the humanities, social and political theorists have studied the origin of class
structures and the conditions under which these structures are preserved or change [6–9].
Archaeologists and other researchers from diverse fields study the factors that lead to
the collapse of civilizations [10, 11]. Anthropological research has focused on the roles
of norms, sanctions, and cooperative behaviour in creating and maintaining hierarchy
[12–14]. In the biological sciences, researchers have questioned whether hierarchy emerges
primarily from differences in intrinsic qualities of individuals (e.g. physical strength,
intelligence, or aggressive tendency) or as a self-organizing process in which a hierarchy
arises as a result of many interactions between the members of the society [15–18].
From a high-level perspective, a fundamental question arises: Can a stable or long-lived
hierarchical structure occur entirely by self-organization, based solely on inter-individual
interactions, modeled as independent pair-wise “fights”? And, if so, what are the typical
structures of hierarchy, and what are the characteristic times of formation and evolution
of the said structures?
“Winner-loser” models are a class of mathematical models that have been used to
study the self-organization of social hierarchy in biology [18–29] and economics [30–
34]. In these models, individuals are characterized by a property, such as “strength”,
“resource holding potential”, or “wealth”, that determines the individual’s position in
society (in the following, we use “strength” as a generic term for this property). Pairs
of individuals come into contact and engage in an interaction (or “fight”). The fight
has a winner and a loser, where the winner experiences a gain in strength, and the
loser loses strength. The models have two basic rules: one that determines who wins
in a given fight, and another that determines the amount of strength gained or lost
in a fight. The distribution of strength, which changes as individuals interact with
each other, represents the societal structure resulting from the model. While stable
societal structures have been analyzed in previous studies of winner-loser models, the
time evolution and intermediary, potentially long-lived societal structures have been
mostly neglected. Here, we aim to close this crucial knowledge gap.
To do so, we construct a generalized winner-loser model in which we intend the strength
property to represent societal status. The amount of status gained by the winner and lost
by the loser of each fight is proportional to the pre-fight status of the losing individual.
We define a probability for winning that is determined by the relative statuses of the
two competitors, modulated by a parameter spanning a continuous range of degree of
authoritarianism from redistributive (lower-status opponent always wins) to totalitarian
(higher-status opponent always wins). The latter modulation for winning contains pre-
vious models as special cases at specific values of the authoritarianism parameter, and
allows a more general description of the dynamics. Over a large range of parameters and
excluding these special cases, we find the emergence of long-lived intermediary societal
structures (distributions of societal status) for the first time. Establishing the existence
2
of these long-lived structures — which can give the illusion of a stable society — and the
relationship between the characteristic time of their evolution and the model parameters
is one of the main contributions of our study.
To demonstrate the relevance of our generalized model and the long-lived structures,
we analyze real-world data. Specifically, we compare data from observational studies on
wins and losses in animal interactions with the results from simulations of our model, and
we compare the distributions of societal status produced by the model with real-world
social hierarchies. To make the latter comparison, we use proxies for societal status in
large social groups. In both cases, the real-world data are consistent with our model.
Specifically, in our model, long-lived intermediary societal structures (distributions of
societal status) arise independent of whether any pair of individuals are equally likely
to interact or not. In the latter case, however, status distributions with more complex
shapes consistent with the household income proxy emerge. We are able to fit the
simulated status distributions to USA household income data with good agreement. To
our knowledge, this is the first model that produces the two-part structure of the proxy
distribution by self-organization based solely on interacting individuals.
The model is presented in section 2 and an extended version of it in which similar-
status individuals interact more frequently than individuals with large differences in
status is presented in section 2.1. Details about the shapes of the status distributions
and their evolution in time are presented in section 3. Comparison of model results to
data from real societies is contained in section 4, where we consider data on agonistic
interactions in non-human animals in section 4.1 and proxies for societal status in large
social groups (social insects and humans) in section 4.2. The article concludes with a
summary of results and some comments regarding future research directions.
2 Definition of the model
Winner-loser models have been constructed using many variations of the rule deter-
mining who wins the fight and the rule determining the amount of strength gained or lost
in a fight, where the particular formulation chosen for each rule depends on the system
under study.
In the rule determining the amount of strength gained and lost in a fight, two for-
mulations have been applied previously. In one version (“additive” rule), the effect of
fighting on an individual’s strength accumulates additively, for example, by the addition
or subtraction of a fixed increment of status [20–25]. In an additive rule, the amount of
strength gained or lost in a fight does not depend on the current value of either individ-
ual’s strength. This means that the amount of strength won or lost in a fight is always
the same, regardless of the strength of one’s opponent.
The other version of this model rule is a “multiplicative” one. Here, the amount of
strength gained or lost is proportional to the strength of one of the individuals involved in
the fight, such that effect of fighting accumulates multiplicatively [27,31–33]. Defeating a
strong opponent produces a large increase in strength, whereas defeating a weak opponent
3
produces a small increase in strength. It is clear from animal behaviour studies that
wins against high ranking individuals increase the rank of an individual more than wins
against low ranking individuals. In this case, a multiplicative rule is therefore more
realistic than an additive rule, in which it is no more advantageous for an individual to
defeat a strong rather than a weak rival. Moreover, whether an additive or multiplicative
rule is used leads to substantially different distributions of strength [19]. For example,
in many models with additive rules, strength becomes distributed such that individuals
of adjacent ranks are separated by the same amount of strength. In multiplicative
models, on the other hand, highly skewed distributions can result, and such multiplicative
processes have been proposed as a common underlying cause of observed inequalities in
natural and social systems [35,36].
Here, we implement a formulation of the multiplicative rule in which the amount
of strength won or lost is proportional to the pre-fight status of the losing individual
(“loser scheme”). In another formulation that has been used in several econophysics
models [32–34, 37–39], the amount of strength won or lost is proportional to the pre-
fight status of the weaker individual, regardless of who wins or loses (“poorer scheme”).
The loser scheme formulation is more realistic in the context of dominance hierarchies,
because upset victories, in which the lower-strength individual in the pair wins, produce
large rewards for the winner and large penalties for the loser. For example, in primate
dominance hierarchies, only a small number of repeated defeats of a higher-strength
individual by the same lower-strength individual are required for their rankings to be
reversed [40]. This scenario is captured by the loser scheme but not by the poorer scheme.
With regards to the rule determining which individual wins in a pairwise fight, two
primary formulations have been applied: one in which the probability that the stronger
individual wins depends on the difference in the strengths of the two individuals [20–
23, 26, 33], and one in which this probability depends on a ratio of the strengths of the
two individuals [27–29]. We focus on the latter of these two formulations. This choice is
related to our choice of the multiplicative rule for the amount of strength won or lost in
the fight. In a multiplicative rule, large absolute differences in strength typically exist
among individuals of similar rank, at the top-end of the strength distribution. Therefore
upsets, in which the lower-strength individual defeats the higher-strength individual,
become very unlikely or impossible at the top-end of the distribution of strength when
the probability of winning depends on the difference in strengths of the two individuals.
When the probability of winning depends on a ratio of the statuses of the two individuals,
upsets tend to be more likely, especially between two high-strength individuals separated
by a large absolute amount of strength.
Conversely, in a model with an additive rule for the amount of strength won or lost,
it may well be appropriate for the probability of winning to depend on the difference in
strengths of the two individuals, since the status of an individual is equal to the difference
in the number of times the individual has won and lost fights. However, especially in
more complex animals, it is unrealistic to assume that the probability of winning is
based on a tally of the number of fights won and lost, as this information is unavailable
to the individuals involved in the fight. Rather, a more realistic assumption is that
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a psychological process occurs in which the two individuals make a rough comparison
of one another’s relative strengths, where this comparison influences each individual’s
probability of winning via characteristics such as confidence, willingness to take risks, and
aggressiveness [2, 27]. This assumption is supported by psychological research showing
that perceived change of a physical stimulus depends on the relative rather than the
absolute change in the stimulus [19,41].
Our specific model is constructed as follows. We consider a system of N individuals,
each possessing a strength property, S, that determines the individual’s societal position.
We intend S to represent the societal status of the individual, and accordingly we refer
to “status” rather than the generic term “strength” in the remainder of this article. At
each step in the simulation, a pair of individuals is randomly selected, and engages in a
“fight”. The probability, p, that the higher-status individual wins the fight is expressed
as a function of its status, S1, and that of its (lower or equal status) opponent, S2:
p =
1
1 + (S2/S1)α
. (1)
When α = 1, the probability that either individual wins is equal to the ratio of its own
status to the sum of its and its opponents statuses. However, as α is tuned to values
other than 1, the advantage held by the higher-status individual changes (Fig 1). As
α → ∞, the higher-status individual is virtually guaranteed to win, regardless of how
strong its opponent is. On the other hand, when α is small but positive, the higher-
status individual only has a large advantage in fights against opponents with much lower
status. When α is negative, 0 ≤ p < 0.5, indicating that the lower-status individual in
any given fight is more likely to win. The parameter α thus generalizes previous modeling
approaches, by allowing the probability for winning a pairwise fight to be continuously
adjusted between end-points where the lower-status individual always wins (α = −∞)
and where the higher-status always wins (α =∞).
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Fig 1: Probability that higher-status individual wins in a pairwise fight. The
probability p(S2/S1) (Eq 1) is shown for different values of α. Solid lines correspond to
α > 0 and dash-dotted lines to α < 0.
To interpret the societal meaning of the parameter α, we note that the probability
p depends on the relative statuses of the two individuals. This means that as long as
the ratio S2/S1 is constant, and given a constant value of α, the probability, p, that the
higher-status individual will win is constant, independent of the absolute values of S1
and S2. In a general sense, the probability that a high-status individual will win in a fight
against a medium-status individual is the same as the probability that a medium-status
individual will win in a fight against a low-status individual. If having a higher societal
status can be considered as having a higher level of “authority” in a hierarchical society,
then the parameter α represents the degree to which there is deference to authority in
the society or, in other words, the society’s overall level of “authoritarianism”.
Next, we explain the rule determining the amount of status transferred from loser to
winner following each fight interaction. Let SW be the before-fight status of the winner
of the fight, and SL the before-fight status of the loser. Following the fight, a portion ∆
of the loser’s before-fight status is transferred to the winner, such that
S′W = SW + ∆
S′L = SL −∆,
where the primed quantities represent after-fight statuses. In our model, the amount
of status transferred, ∆, is equal to a proportion of the before-fight status of the individ-
ual who loses the fight. That is, ∆ = δSL, where δ is a fraction between 0 and 1. This
gives us:
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S′W = SW + δSL
S′L = SL − δSL,
(2)
This rule for the amount of status transferred has realistic implications from the per-
spective of formation and maintenance of social hierarchy, because it means that upsets
(in which the lower-status individual defeats the higher-status individual) produce large
rewards for the winner and large penalties for the loser.
The two rules contained in Eqs 1 and 2 constitute our “original” (two-parameter)
model that is the main focus of this work. We note that special cases of Eq 1 were
investigated in previous work. Specifically, the case when p = 0.5 in all fights, regardless
of the statuses of the two individuals (α = 0 in our model) and the case when p = 1 in
all fights (α =∞ in our model) were investigated in a model that uses the same rule as
our Eq 2 [31]. The special case when α = 1 has been used in other winner-loser models,
but never in conjunction with a multiplicative rule like our Eq 2. The novel parameter
α thus allows us to generalize previous models and opens a previously unexplored region
of parameter space. We also present a simple extension to our two-parameter model, in
the following section.
2.1 Model extension: restricting fights between individuals with
large differences in status
One of the main assumptions of winner-loser models based solely on the two cate-
gories of rules described in section 2 is that any pair of individuals are equally likely
to interact, regardless of their strengths. Some biologically-oriented winner-loser models
have included mechanisms that adjust the interaction probability of individuals based
on their spatial positions or on their strengths. For example, in Ref. [27], each individ-
ual decides whether to engage in a fight by comparing the ratio of its strength to its
opponent’s strength with a threshold; in Ref. [29] individuals move in a spatial territory
and interact if they are within visual range of one another; and in Ref. [21], individuals
interact with a probability equal to the product of a function of their strengths, such
that stronger individuals interact more frequently than weaker individuals. In a similar
vein, we can extend our model by implementing a third model rule under which pairs
of individuals with large differences in status fight less often than similar-status individ-
uals. Unlike other rules that control the probability that two individuals interact, our
rule allows all individuals with similar statuses to interact frequently, while also reducing
the frequency of interactions (and thus the exchange of status) between individuals with
large differences in status.
These are needed realistic features, because evidence from studies of hierarchies in
animal groups suggests that a large proportion of the status-determining interactions
experienced by high status individuals pit these individuals against “challengers” who
themselves have higher than average status [40, 42, 43]. Meanwhile, low status individ-
uals tend not to challenge high status individuals, such that low status individuals are
more likely to interact amongst themselves [43]. Similarly, humans are more likely to
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interact with members of their own social classes, especially at the extremes of the so-
cial class spectrum [44], and residential segregation, which impedes interactions between
members of different social classes, is considered to be a primary factor in the creation
and exacerbation of social stratification [45].
Specifically, our extended model introduces two additional parameters. First, following
from observations that high status individuals are more likely to engage in fights with
similarly high status challengers, the new rule imposes that two selected individuals only
engage in a fight if their absolute statuses are separated by not more than a threshold
amount ηS¯. Here, η ≥ 0 is a new parameter that sets the size of the threshold relative to
the (conserved) average status of the system, S¯, which is a natural reference point for the
threshold position. Secondly, notwithstanding the above-noted observations regarding
the higher frequency of interactions between similar-status individuals, animal behaviour
studies also show that high status individuals do interact with low status individuals at
times. This occurs, for example, through seemingly random acts of aggression which
may play an important role in maintaining hierarchical rank-ordering [46]. For this
reason, a realistic model should not exclude the possibility that fights between high and
low status individuals will occasionally occur. Therefore, regardless of the result of the
threshold criterion, the fight between the two selected individuals takes place if r < ,
where 0 ≤  ≤ 1 is a new parameter and r is a random number such that 0 ≤ r < 1.
In summation, the new rule to limit interactions based on the statuses of the two
competitors can be stated as follows: two individuals are selected at random, and they
fight if S1 − S2 ≤ ηS¯ OR r ≤ . We note that, in the implementation of the simulation,
this rule does not change the probability with which any two particular individuals are
selected from the population, but only adds a threshold criterion to decide whether or
not the fight occurs between the selected pair.
3 Time-evolution and structure of status distributions
In the society envisioned in the model, pairs of individuals interact such that they gain
or lose societal status in accordance with the rules described in section 2. As interactions
take place, and status is exchanged between the members of the society, a distribution of
societal status takes shape. Our primary goal in this study is to investigate the structure
of these status distributions and how they evolve in time. In this section, we therefore
investigate the shapes of the status distributions as functions of the model parameters δ
and α (section 3.2), and then quantify their time evolution in terms of two characteristic
times (sections 3.3-3.5). Before presenting these results, we first (section 3.1) establish
how time is defined in the model. This introduces the first characteristic time of the
system’s evolution, which gives us a basis on which to present the results in the following
sections. Please note that in the directly following sections we focus on the original
(two-parameter) version of the model first as many features are qualitatively the same
as for the extended version of the model. The features specific to the extended model
are then discussed in section 3.6.
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3.1 Definition of time and the characteristic time τ1
In order to discuss the shapes and time-evolution of the status distributions formed
by simulations of the model, we must establish how time is defined. For simplicity and
without loss of generality, we model the pairwise interactions as instantaneous such that
they can be described as sequential events. We consider that one unit of time has passed
once all members of the society have, on average, engaged in one pairwise interaction
or fight. Under this definition of time, the rate at which an individual participates in
a fight is an intrinsic frequency of the system, independent of system size, N , where N
is the number of individuals in the system. Time, t, is therefore defined as t = 2t′/N ,
where t′ is the number of fights that have occurred since the initiation of the simulation,
and the factor of 2 comes from having each interaction involve two individuals. One unit
of time is equal to N/2 fights.
Previous work by Ispolatov et al. [31] shows the existence of a characteristic time in
a model that is mathematically equivalent to our original (two-parameter) model in the
case where α = 0. An analytic solution for the time evolution of the variance of the
status distribution (wealth distribution, in Ref. [31]) was found to be as follows:
M2(t) =
δS¯
1− δ
(
1− e−δ(1−δ)t
)
, (3)
where the variance (second central moment) M2(t) can be calculated directly from
the status distribution:
M2(t) =
∑N
i=1
(
Si(t)− S¯
)2
N
, (4)
where Si(t) is the status of individual i at time t, and S¯ is the (conserved) average
status.
Similar to Eq 3, higher moments of the status distribution converge to constant values,
and the status distribution attains a steady state. Eq 3 therefore shows that the variance
approaches a steady-state value of M2 = δS¯/(1−δ) at large times and that the approach
to the steady-state is characterized by a time constant equal to (δ(1 − δ))−1. Eq 3 can
be re-written in a form that is useful for our purposes:
M2 = c1(1− e−t/τ1), (5)
where c1 and τ1 are generally functions of δ and α. In the following, we use the
symbols cˆ1 and τˆ1 to represent these functions when α = 0, such that τˆ1 = (δ(1− δ))−1
and cˆ1 = δS¯/(1− δ), as per Eq 3. Appendix S1 (part A) contains a demonstration that
our definition of time corresponds to how time is defined in the analytical result in Eq 3.
3.2 Overview of status distributions produced by the model
In this section, we present the shapes of the societal structures (distributions of status)
that emerge in simulations of the model. We begin by setting α = 0 (p = 0.5 for all
fights, regardless of the statuses of the competitors as per Eq 1) because, in this limiting
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case, there always results a stable steady-state status distribution as we show in the
following.
In Fig 2, we show graphs of steady-state distributions for several values of δ when
α = 0. As can be seen, the shape of the steady-state distribution varies from rather
egalitarian for small δ (e.g. δ = 0.04: all individuals have close to the average status) to
highly unequal (e.g. δ = 0.81: most individuals have very low status and small portion
of the population has very high status). As was noted in section 3.1, when α = 0, our
model is mathematically equivalent to the model of Ispolatov et al. [31], who showed
that the tail of the distribution decays exponentially for all values of δ.
The inset of Fig 2 shows the time evolution of the variance of the status distribution,
M2, which provides a measure of the level of inequality of the society. Larger values of
δ give rise to larger steady-state value of M2. As expected from Eq 3, M2 approaches
a steady-state plateau with a value of cˆ1. The skewness γ = M3/(M2)
3/2, where M3 is
the third central moment of the distribution, also arrives at a steady-state plateau at
large time (dashed grey lines in inset of Fig 2). This plateau in M2 and γ indicates that
the shape of the status distribution is unchanging in time. The plateau in γ2 is equal to
four times that of the plateau in M2, as can be shown by solving for the third moment
following the approach presented in Ref. [31].
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Fig 2: Shape of status distributions as function of δ, with α = 0. Distributions
range from more egalitarian (e.g. δ = 0.04: all individuals have close to the average
status) to highly unequal (e.g. δ = 0.81: most individuals have very low status and
small portion of the population has very high status). Inset of (a): plateau in M2
(coloured) and squared skewness (grey) indicate that status distributions are in steady-
state. Larger values of δ correspond to larger steady-state value of M2, such that M2
provides a measure of the level of inequality of the society. Distributions obtained after
simulating up to time t = 64τˆ1. N = 10
5, nr = 5.
Fig 3 shows distributions of societal status obtained for a fixed value of δ and for
various values of the authoritarianism α. The curve for α = 0, δ = 0.14 from Fig 2
is reproduced in Fig 3, along with the inset, showing that M2(t) undergoes an initial
transient period before arriving at a plateau value for times t τˆ1.
However, for large values of α > 0 (α = 0.6 and α = 0.8), the inset of Fig 3 shows a
rapid increase of M2(t) that continues beyond the initial transient period. The status
distributions are rapidly evolving (“running away”) toward a totalitarian end-state in
which a single individual possesses virtually all of the societal status of the system and
all other individuals have status approaching zero. The shape of the status distribution
changes rapidly during this evolution, becoming more and more skewed with time. Ad-
ditional figures showing how the status distributions evolve over long times are contained
in Part E of Appendix S1, and part F of Appendix S1 contains a proof that only one
individual with non-negligible status remains in the totalitarian end-state.
For smaller values of α > 0 (α = 0.2 and α = 0.4), M2(t) (and therefore the shape
of the status distribution) appears to be virtually unchanged in the time following the
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initial transient period shown in Fig 3. Yet, as we show below (sections 3.3 and 3.4),
M2(t) does increase with t, albeit much more slowly, such that the status distributions
can be considered to be in a long-lived state, where the shape of the distribution can
change so slowly that it is essentially unchanged over sufficiently short observation times.
Fig 3 also shows the status distributions that arise when α < 0. For this region of
parameter-space, the lower-status individual has a higher probability of winning the fight
than the higher-status individual. Our numerical simulations show that the distributions
are in steady-state (as for α = 0) and become more egalitarian (smaller M2) as α is
decreased while δ is held constant.
0 1 2 3
S
0.0
0.5
1.0
p
(S
)
0 100 200 300
t
0
1
M
2 α=−0.8
α=−0.2
α=0.0
α=0.2
α=0.4
α=0.6
α=0.8
Fig 3: Shape of status distributions as functions of α, with δ = 0.14. Increasing
α leads to an increase in the level of inequality of the society, while decreasing α leads
to a decrease in the level of inequality. Inset: when α > 0, M2 does not attain a plateau
but continues to increase with t, at a rate that depends on α. The status distribution
appears to be in steady-state for small values of α > 0 (e.g. α = 0.2 and α = 0.4 curves
in the inset) when observed on short enough time scales, while they are in fact not.
For larger values of α > 0 (e.g. α = 0.6 and α = 0.8 curves in the inset), the level of
inequality noticeably increases on the observation timescale, indicating a runaway of the
status distribution toward an end-state of maximum inequality. Distributions obtained
after simulating up to time t = 64τˆ1. N = 10
5, nr = 5.
The plots in Figs 2 and 3 were obtained using an “egalitarian” initial condition, in
which all individuals have an initial status of S = 1. Appendix S1 (part B) contains
figures showing that the same distributions arise when the system is prepared in a “uni-
form” initial condition in which the initial statuses are randomly selected from a uniform
distribution with S¯ = 1.
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3.3 Long-lived behaviour
In this section we quantify the time evolution and the long-lived behaviour of the
status distributions produced by the model by examining the evolution of the variance
of the status distribution, M2(t), when α > 0 (Fig 4a-c).
As noted in section 3.2, for large values of α, the status distribution runs away to an
end-state in which a single individual possesses virtually all of the status in the society,
and all other individuals have virtually zero status. In this totalitarian end-state, the
variance M2 approaches an upper plateau
c2 = (N − 1)S¯2 = N − 1, (6)
where the average status is defined in the model to be S¯ = 1, without loss of generality.
The upper plateau c2 is the maximum possible value of M2 (indicating the maximum
level of inequality of the society). For finite-sized systems, M2 rises to this upper plateau
at large times. This large-time ascent to c2 happens quickly for large values of α, and
much more slowly for smaller values of α (main plot of Fig 4a).
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Fig 4: Evolution of M2(t) for α > 0. Values of α are indicated in the legend in (b),
and δ = 0.2 for all curves. (a) shows rapid ascent of M2(t) to upper plateau value for
α = 1.0 and α = 2.5 (main plot), and the inset of (a) shows three of the curves on log-log
scale, with stages 1-3 of the evolution of M2(t) indicated for the α = 0.5 curve. (b) and
(c) show the main plot of (a) at different magnifications, to allow inspection of the fit
of Eq 7 (dashed black lines) to the curves with α ≤ 0.6. (d) fit parameters, with y axis
scale for τ−12 shown on righthand side (parameters for α = 0 are from Eq 7, assuming
τ2 =∞). N = 100, nr = 500.
There therefore appear to be two relevant time-scales in the dynamics of the status
distributions: one controlling the evolution away from the initial condition, and a second
controlling the long-time approach to the totalitarian end-state. To capture the dynamics
of M2(t) for α > 0, we attempt to fit, to the simulation data, a sum of exponential
functions:
M2 = c1(1− e−t/τ1) + (c2 − c1)(1− e−t/τ2), (7)
where τ2 is a characteristic time controlling the rate of approach of M2 to the upper
plateau. The first term in Eq 7 relates to the short-time dynamics of the status distri-
bution, while the second term relates to the long-time dynamics. Long-lived states are
produced for values of the model parameters α and δ for which τ2 is much larger than the
time, τobs, over which the system is observed (simulated), and τ1. When τ1  t  τ2,
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Eq. 7 becomes M2(t) ≈ c1(1 − e−t/τ1) where, for α > 0, c1 represents an operational
plateau value of M2(t) corresponding to the long-lived state.
Fits of Eq 7 to simulated data are shown by the black dashed lines in Fig 4. For these
fits, c2 is fixed at its upper plateau value c2 = N − 1. Although the fits are imperfect
(Fig 4c), they do appear to capture the short-time “elbow” controlled by τ1 and c1, and
the long-time ascent toward the upper plateau controlled by τ2 (Fig 4b). Fig 4d shows
the fit parameters as functions of α: as α is increased, both c1 and τ1 increase, resulting
in a slower evolution of M2 (and therefore, of the shape of the status distribution) away
from the initial condition. On the other hand, as α increases, τ2 decreases, leading to
a more rapid (long-time) approach to the upper plateau. As α is increased to larger
values, it becomes difficult to resolve the early-time “elbow”, and thus difficult to obtain
a meaningful fit of Eq 7. Furthermore, as shown in Fig 4c, the shape of M2(t) appears
to approach a straight line (at early times) as α → 1, and then, to bend upwards away
from such an initial straight line when α > 1.
For small α > 0, the status distributions pass through three phenomenological stages,
beginning with an egalitarian initial condition and ending in the totalitarian end-state
(see Appendix S1, part E for details). The first stage pertains to the evolution of the
status distribution away from its initial condition over time scales of the order τ1 and
into a distribution with a form similar to that of the α = 0 steady-state distribution.
This “stage 2” distribution changes only very slowly, eventually transitioning into a stage
(“stage 3”) where high status individuals are nearly guaranteed to win all fights. The
duration of stage 2 decreases and essentially disappears as α is increased, explaining the
inability of Eq 7 to represent M2(t) for larger values of α. In the asymptotic state of the
evolution t  τ2, all individuals have S ≈ 0, except for a single individual with status
equal to the total status of the system.
Our findings are largely independent of the system size N . As shown explicitly in the
SI (Appendix S1, part C), the parameters controlling the early-time behaviour of M2
(c1 and τ1) remain constant as the system size, N , is increased, whereas the parameters
controlling the long-time behaviour of M2 (c2 and τ2) both scale linearly with N . A
proof that the time required to reach the end-state, τend, scales linearly with N in the
extreme scenario where δ = 1 and α = ∞ is also included in Appendix S1 (part D),
as a demonstration of the configurational reasons why the long-time (approach to the
end-state) evolution of the model dynamics increases in proportion to the system size
N .
3.4 Phenomenology of the characteristic time τ2 when α > 0
The characteristic time τ2 controls the rate at which the system approaches the total-
itarian end-state when α > 0. This characteristic time increases as α is decreased from
large positive values, as shown in Fig 4d. We can also see, from comparison of Eqs 3
and 7, that τ2 = ∞ when α = 0. We would like to know the functional relationship
between τ2 and the model parameters in order to quantitatively characterize the tran-
sition between long-lived and runaway behaviours. To further explore this relationship,
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we consider an analogy with the barrier-like or “activated” processes typical of many
physical systems [47]. We find that the resulting Arrhenius equation provides a good
description of the relationship between τ2 and the model parameters α and δ. This allows
us to determine, as a function of the model parameters, the observation times over which
status distributions can be considered long-lived, which we summarize in the following
section.
The rate of an activated process is proportional to an exponential term containing an
energy barrier scaled by temperature. The exponential term is multiplied by a pre-factor
called the attempt frequency, which is typically independent of temperature. This type
of relationship between rate and temperature can be found in many diverse physical phe-
nomena, including the rate of chemical reactions [47], the relationship between diffusion
coefficients and temperature [47], the rate of nucleation according to the classical nucle-
ation theory [48], the viscosity of strong glass-formers [49], and the blocking transition in
superparamagnetism [50], as well as in biology regarding, for example, the rate of chirp-
ing in crickets and of flashing in fireflies, and in psychology, where human perception of
time is related to body temperature through a relationship of this form [51].
If the characteristic time τ2 is regulated by α according to an activated process, then
one would expect the relationship between τ2 and α to follow an Arrhenius equation of
the form:
1
τ2
= f0e
−αb/α, (8)
where αb is a term that plays a role similar to an energy barrier in an activated process
and f0 is analogous to an attempt frequency. To test this idea, we plot the logarithm
of N/τ2 vs. α
−1 in Fig 5a. The factor of N is included due to the fact that τ2 scales
linearly with N , as discussed in section 3.3 and shown in Appendix S1 (part C).
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Fig 5: Arrhenius relationship between τ2 and α and δ. a) Plots of ln[N/τ2] vs.
α−1 for various values of δ confirm the relationship proposed in the Arrhenius equation
(Eq 8). The slope of each linear fit is −αb(δ). A discussion regarding the evaluation of
errors on the extracted values of τ2 is included in Appendix S1 (part G). b) Dependence
of αb and Nf0 on the parameter δ: the red line in the main plot (linear scale) and upper
inset (logarithmic scale) corresponds to αb = 0.53δ
−1.21; the red line in the lower inset
corresponds to Nf0 = 1.03δ
1.28.
The linear behaviour seen in Fig 5a confirms the relationship between τ2 and α pro-
posed in the Arrhenius equation (Eq 8). In the figure, the δ-dependent slopes of the
linear fits correspond to −αb, and the intercepts to ln[Nf0]. The values of αb extracted
from the linear fits in Fig 5a are shown as a function of δ in Fig 5b. As can be seen, αb
diverges as δ is decreased. The red line in Fig 5b (main plot and upper inset) shows the
function αb = 0.53δ
−1.21.
In Fig 5a, the y-intercepts of the linear fits appear to cluster around 0, suggesting
that the prefactor Nf0 in the expression for N/τ2 following from the Arrhenius equation
is of the order of 1 for the values of δ considered. The y-intercepts do not, however,
give a robust determination of the prefactor Nf0. This may be due to a change in
functional form of Eq 7 as α increases such that τ1 vanishes. Alternatively, the prefactor
Nf0 can be directly determined by setting α = ∞ (equivalent to p = 1 in Eq 1) in
the simulations and extracting τ2(α = ∞) from M2(t). In so doing, we have assumed
that t  τ1 and c2  c1 such that Eq 7 becomes M2(t) ≈ c2(1 − e−t/τ2). Nf0 is then
equal to N/τ2(α = ∞). This approach provides more robust determinations of Nf0,
which are shown in the lower inset of Fig 5b, along with a fit (red line) of the function
Nf0 = 1.03δ
1.28.
Substituting the expressions for Nf0 and αb into the Arrhenius equation (Eq 8) gives:
N
τ2
≈ 1.03δ1.28e−0.53/(αδ1.21). (9)
The Arrhenius equation and Eq 9 show that τ2 diverges exponentially as α → 0.
This is consistent with Eq 3, which indicates that τ2 = ∞ when α = 0. Moreover, the
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parameter δ appears in both the pre-factor and the argument of the exponential of Eq
9, such that as δ → 0, τ2 →∞, regardless of the value of α. This is consistent with the
fact that for δ = 0 no status is exchanged during a pairwise interaction and the initial
status distribution is trivially stable. These observations strongly suggest that stable
status distributions only exist for α ≤ 0 as well as δ = 0. When α > 0, Eq 9 allows
us to identify the time scale of the transition between long-lived societal structures and
runaway toward the totalitarian end-state as we discuss in more detail below.
3.5 δ − α phase diagram
As shown in sections 3.2-3.4, for all positive values of δ, the model gives rise to three
regions of behaviour: true steady-state status distributions (α ≤ 0), long-lived status
distributions that eventually arrive at the totalitarian end-state (small values of α > 0),
and runaway (rapid evolution) toward the totalitarian end-state (large values of α > 0).
These three regions and the transitions between are portrayed in a δ−α phase diagram
in Fig 6.
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Fig 6: δ − α phase diagram. The model exhibits three regions of behaviour in
δ − α parameter-space: I (α ≤ 0 or δ = 0): true (infinite-duration) steady-state status
distributions; II (small values of α > 0): long-lived status distributions; III (large values
of α > 0): runaway behaviour. Within regions I and II, equi-M2 lines (lines of equal
standard deviation of the status distribution) are shown with M2 values indicated in
parentheses below each equi-M2 line. The location of the transition between regions
II and III is observation time-dependent, and is marked by the black triangular points
for τobs = 10
4 and by the red triangular points for τobs = 10
3, as determined directly
from the simulation data. The location of the transition as determined by the Arrhenius
relation between τ2 and α is shown by the black (τobs = 10
4) and red (τobs = 10
3) curves.
System size N = 1000.
Fig 6 is a summary of the main results of our model. In it, we see the three regions of
behaviour described in sections 3.2-3.4,. The region (marked with a roman numeral I) of
infinite-duration steady-state status distributions is separated from a region (II) of long-
lived status distributions by a transition that occurs due to an exponential divergence
of the characteristic time τ2 as α→ 0+. Runaway behaviour (region III) occurs when a
noticeable slope is observed in the evolution of M2(t0 (see the inset of Fig 3 for α = 0.6
and α = 0.8). Whether such a slope is observed or not depends on τ2(δ, α) and on
the time, τobs, over which the system is observed. The location, in δ − α parameter-
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space, of the transition between regions II and III therefore depends on τobs, and can be
determined directly from the data or via Eq 9, as described below.
We determined the location of the transition between regions II and III in two ways.
First, we used a simple criterion to equate the onset of runaway with the appearance
of a positive slope in the long-time portion of M2(t). In this way, the long-lived state
corresponds to a plateau value of M2(t) over a particular τobs (where τobs  τ1). The
long-lived state is considered to be lost when, instead of a plateau, a positive slope is
observed in M2(t) after a time τobs has transpired. The black and red triangular markers
in Fig 6 indicate the onset of runaway as determined by this criterion, for τobs = 10, 000
and τobs = 1, 000, respectively. Secondly, the location of the transition can be determined
using the Arrhenius relation presented in section 3.4 to determine the value of α for which
M2(t) increases by a sufficient amount after a time τobs has transpired. The location of
the transition as determined by the Arrhenius relation is shown by the curving curving
black and red lines in Fig 6. Details about how these two approaches were conducted
are contained in Appendix S1 (part I).
While α largely determines the stability of the asymptotic status distributions, the
exact value of δ > 0 influences the shape of the status distribution, as already seen
for α = 0 in section 3.2. This is also true for the long-lived distributions. Essentially
identical distributions can be produced (within a particular simulation time) for different
combinations of the parameters δ and α (see part H of Appendix S1 for details). Sets
of such points are plotted as “equi-M2” lines (lines of equal standard deviation of the
status distribution) within regions I and II in Fig 6.
3.6 Status distributions in the extended model
In section 2.1, we presented a simple extension to the original (two-parameter) model
that restricts which individuals can fight each other based on the proximity in their sta-
tuses. This “extended model” introduces two new parameters: η, which sets a threshold
ηS¯ (where S¯ is the average status of the system), such that individuals with statuses
separated by an amount more than this threshold are restricted from fighting with each
other; and , the probability with which two individuals that have a separation of statuses
greater than ηS¯ do nevertheless fight each other.
Fig 7 shows distributions of status generated by simulations of the extended model. A
log-linear scale is used in the righthand column of plots to allow inspection of the high-
status tails of the status distributions. In all subplots, α = 0 and δ = 0.2. When  = 1
(Fig 7a-b) the original (two-parameter) model is recovered, such that the parameter η
has no effect on the shape of the status distribution. Also, when  = 1, the high-status
tail of the distribution decays exponentially, in accordance with the analytic result found
by Ispolatov et al. [31] (Fig 7b). When  is decreased, a “break” in the high-status tail of
the distribution emerges, as can be seen in the log-linear plot in Fig 7d. Following this
break, the distribution enters a second exponentially-decaying regime (black dashed line
in Fig 7d) that ends with a cutoff. Increases to η cause the location of the break as well
as the location of the peak of the distribution to shift to higher values of S. The plateaus
in M2(t) (insets in Fig 7) for  > 0 indicate that these distributions are in steady-state.
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Fig 7: Status distributions in the extended model. δ = 0.2 and α = 0 in all plots.
Plots (b) and (d) show the distributions on a logarithmic scale, in order to allow for
inspection of the large-S tail. When  is decreased from 1, a “break” in the distribution
emerges, (particularly evident on the logarithmic scale) corresponding to a society with
distinguishable low status and high status groups or classes. The black dashed lines in
(b) and (d) are maximum likelihood fits of exponential distributions with lower-bound at
S = 2.25 in (b) and [lower-bound, upper-bound] at S = [0.75, 5.0] in (d), where plotted
fit line in (d) is extrapolated beyond S = 5.0. System size N = 105.
When  = 0 (not shown), M2(t) does not obtain a plateau and continues to increase
over the duration of the simulation time. For this value of the parameter , the system
approaches an end-state in which the majority of individuals have status approaching
zero, and a small minority of individuals have large statuses. In this end-state, the
few high-status individuals are prevented from interacting with each other because their
statuses are separated by amounts greater than ηS¯. The specific configuration of the
 = 0 end-state depends on the particular sequence of interactions. A positive value of 
is therefore needed in order for the simulation to obtain a unique steady-state.
In the plots in Fig 7, α = 0. The distributions produced with α = 0, η > 0, and
 > 0 show a plateau in M2(t). When α > 0, M2(t) behaves qualitatively in the same
way as the original (two-parameter) model. That is, a long-lived state is observed for
small values of α > 0, and a runaway for large values of α > 0, where the location
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of the transition between the long-lived state and runaway depends on the observation
(simulation) time. Several figures showing how the extended model distributions evolve
for representative values of α > 0 are included in Appendix S1 (part J).
4 Comparison of model results with real-world data
In this section, we compare the results of our model to data from real-world social
hierarchies in two ways. First, we consider data on agonistic interactions (fights) from
animal observation studies, in section 4.1. We are able to make some general comments
about the parameter values and the stage in the time evolution of the system for which
the win and loss patterns in the simulations resemble and are consistent with the animal
behaviour data. We note that the available data in this case is for small system sizes.
Thus, the history of each particular pair of individuals’ past interactions might be im-
portant since the individuals do recognize and remember one another. This feature is
not captured by our model, which is a better description for large groups of individuals,
in which there is a large probability that an individual i’s next interaction will be with
an opponent with whom i did not interact recently.
Unfortunately, there are currently no observational interaction data for sufficiently
large groups of individuals. In order to compare the distributions of societal status from
the model with real-world social hierarchies, we therefore seek a measurable quantity
that serves as a proxy for societal status in large social groups. Such a proxy must
allow the assignment of a status value to all individuals in a large society. We have
reviewed potential proxies for status in non-human animals, and found that body-size in
insects seems to be the only such quantity for which data is currently available for large
groups. We present a comparison to our model in section 4.2.1. In the case of humans,
socioeconomic data about large groups is available and we justify the use of household
income as a proxy for societal status in large human societies and compare this proxy to
status distributions from our model in section 4.2.2.
4.1 Agonistic interactions in small groups of animals
In many studies across a wide range of taxa [52], researchers of animal social behaviour
have observed and recorded agonistic interactions between pairs of individuals. These
interactions, which include aggressions, physical and non-physical threats, and submis-
sive behaviours [1] can be considered as “fights” in which a winner and loser can be
identified. From these observations, an “interaction matrix” can be created, with a row
and column for each individual, and where each entry (i, j) of the matrix represents the
number of times i has defeated j in a pairwise fight. Various methods exist to determine
a rank-ordering of the individuals in the society from the data contained in the interac-
tion matrix [26,53–55]. Correlations can then be investigated between hierarchical rank
and outcomes such as health, reproductive success, quality of social relationships, and
preferential access to resources of the individuals in the social group.
A common observation in many such studies is that the higher-ranked individual in a
pair wins the large majority of the fights against the lower-ranked individual. However, in
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most datasets, a small number of interactions occur in which the lower-ranked individual
wins the fight (called “reversals” in the animal behaviour literature). In our model,
the distributions of status that most closely resemble this scenario are highly-skewed
distributions in which p ≈ 1 (see Eq 1) for many pairs of individuals, such that reversals
are rare but still possible. This excludes α ≤ 0, since reversals are frequent in this range
of parameter space, and highlights the relevance of the long-lived states observed in our
model (see Fig 6). For small values of α > 0, the said distributions occur at late stages
in the evolution of the system, and for larger values of α > 0, at the said distributions
occur at the stage immediately following the evolution of the system away from the
initial condition (see the discussion regarding the three phenomenological stages of the
evolution of the system described in section 3.3 and part E of Appendix S1).
In Fig 8, we compare interaction matrices from an animal observational study with
“simulated interaction matrices” from our model. We use the largest interaction matrices
included in the recent review of Shizuka and McDonald [52], which were from a study of
adult female mountain goats by Coˆte´ [56]. Coˆte´ published interaction matrices recorded
over four summers, from 1994-1997, where N = 26 individuals were present in all four
years. We ran simulations of the model for a system size N = 26, in which we recorded
interaction matrices for the individuals in the simulation. These “simulated interaction
matrices” were recorded over four separate time periods, where the duration of each time
period was equal to the number of interactions recorded during each of Coˆte´’s summers of
observation (Coˆte´ recorded an average of 279 interactions/summer for the 26 goats, using
ad libitum sampling). The simulated interaction matrices were each separated by a time
period corresponding roughly to the number of pair-wise interactions that N = 26 female
mountain goats are expected to have in one year, estimated here to be approximately
105 interactions from the rate of 3 interactions/individual/hour found in Ref. [57]. We
allowed each simulation to evolve to a time t0  τˆ1 before recording the first simulated
interaction matrix, to bypass the initial transient evolution of the simulation away from
the egalitarian initial condition. The mountain goat interaction matrices change very
little from year to year. This corresponds to a very slowly evolving simulation, where
the status distribution remains essentially unchanged between recordings of the simulated
interaction matrices, highlighting again the relevance of the long-lived states observed in
our model. This occurs for small values of the parameter δ (δ = 0.01 was used in Fig 8).
In Fig8a, we show a comparison of the “David’s Score”, D, calculated from the sim-
ulated and real interaction matrices. D is a commonly-used score that allows a ranking
of the individuals in an interaction matrix. It is defined as follows [53, 58]. Let sij be
the number of times individual i has won in an fight against individual j, and let nij be
the total number of fights between i and j. Pij = sij/nij is then the proportion of wins
that i has experienced in fights with j. The proportion of losses that i has experienced
in fights with j is 1 − Pij = Pji, and when nij = 0, Pij and Pji are set equal to 0 [53].
Let wi =
∑N
j=1,j 6=i Pij and wi,2 =
∑N
j=1,j 6=i wjPij , such that the sum in wi,2 is weighted
by the wj of each opponent j. Similarly, let li =
∑N
j=1,j 6=i Pji and li,2 =
∑N
j=1,j 6=i ljPji.
The David’s Score of an individual is Di = wi + wi,2 − li − li,2. D thus depends not
only on the proportions of wins and losses experienced by an individual, but also on the
win and loss proportions of those with whom the individual has fought. For example, if
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an individual i defeats an opponent who has won a large proportion of his or her fights,
this causes a large increase Di, whereas if i loses to an individual who has lost a large
proportion of his or her fights, this causes a large decrease in Di.
Fig 8a shows that the set of D’s calculated from the simulated interaction matrices
resembles the one from the mountain goat interaction matrices, and that this resemblance
is maintained after allowing a large number of interactions (105) to take place between
recording the simulated interaction matrices. Fig8b shows that, in the mountain goats,
the more successful individual wins the fight almost all of the time, considering those
pairs of individuals that engaged in three or more fights. A similar result was obtained
from the simulation for the parameter values used in Fig8a. Fig 8b also shows that,
when α = 0 (such that p = 0.5 in Eq 1), there are few pairs for which the more
successful individual wins all fights (as expected), such that α > 0 is required in order
to have a good comparison with the animal data. Only those pairs of individuals that
had engaged in three or more fights were considered in the histograms in Fig 8b, in
order to avoid high fluctuations due to small numbers of fights. Also included in Fig
8 are heatmap plots showing the probability that individual i defeats individual j in
a pairwise fight, calculated from the mountain goat interaction matrices (Fig 8c) and
the simulated interaction matrices (Fig 8d), showing visually that reversals are rare but
non-negligible.
Many animal observation studies have found similar interaction matrices to Coˆte´’s
mountain goat matrices, in that they have small numbers of reversals [52]. The results
from our model therefore suggest that many animal groups have highly-skewed distri-
butions of status and relatively large values of the authoritarianism, α. On the other
hand, it is known that animal species with more complex social organization can have
a larger number of reversals and intransitive relationships (where individual i wins the
majority of fights against j, who wins the majority of fights against k, who in turn wins
the majority of fights against i) [3, 59]. This may correspond to a less highly-skewed
distribution of status in our model. Little is presently known about the frequency of
reversals and intransitive relationships in large social groups due to a lack of interaction
data for large groups. A key problem in this regard is that the proportion of pairs of
individuals for which no interactions are observed generally grows with system size in in-
teraction matrices from observational studies, due to the increasing difficulty of observing
all pairs [52].
Due to the small value of δ required to obtain quasi-stationarity of the status distri-
bution over large numbers of fights in the simulations in Fig 8, the model suggests that
relatively small amounts of status (e.g., one one-hundredth of an individual’s current sta-
tus when δ = 0.01) are exchanged in a single interaction. In female mountain goats, rank
is strongly correlated with age, and older goats almost always win interactions against
younger goats [56]. Larger values of δ and smaller values of α may apply in other animal
societies in which ranks change more frequently or where age is a less important factor,
including in some primate species in which complex power struggles leading to takeovers
are commonly observed [60,61].
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We also note that for the N = 26 individuals present in all 4 years of Coˆte´’s study,
there was no tendency for individuals to interact more frequently with those close in rank
than with those far away in rank, although such a tendency is observed when considering
all individuals in a single summer, as shown in Fig 6 of Ref. [56] (see part A of Appendix
S2 for further details). Our subset of N = 26 individuals leaves out those individuals
who enter the group (primarily, by ageing to the age of maturity of 3 years old) and
who leave the group (primarily, by dying at old age) from one year to the next, which
indicates that the tendency observed by Coˆte´ for individuals to interact more frequently
with those closer in rank is mostly due to interactions involving the oldest and youngest
individuals within the group. The absence of this tendency in the N = 26 subgroup that
we consider supports our use of the original (two-parameter) model in the simulations
in Fig 8.
Lastly, for the model simulations shown in Fig 8, the characteristic time τ2 ≈ 59 years,
significantly longer than the 12-15 year life expectancy of mountain goats [62]. The ul-
timate collapse of the system to the totalitarian end-state exhibited by our model may
therefore not be relevant for mountain goats, since factors such as births, deaths, matu-
ration of juveniles, and immigration, which are not considered in our model but which
occur on time-scales significantly shorter than τ2, will change the long-term dynamics of
the system significantly.
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Fig 8: Comparison of model results with animal interaction data. (a) David’s Scores,
D, calculated from the mountain goat interaction data of Ref. [56], for each of four sum-
mers from 1994-1997 (solid points). Individuals are ordered by decreasing D along the
x-axis, and the value of D is plotted on the y-axis. The coloured bands show 5%− 95%
ranges for D calculated from interaction matrices obtained from simulations of the origi-
nal (two-parameter) model with δ = 0.01, α = 0.99, and t′0 = 5×105 interactions, where
t′0 = N t0/2 as per the definition of time in section 3.1. nr = 100 realizations of the sim-
ulation were performed. (b) Histogram of p>2, the probability that the more successful
individual won in a pairwise interaction, considering only those pairs of individuals that
engaged in three or more interactions. p>2 was calculated from the interaction matrices
corresponding to the blue points (animal data from 1994) and blue band (simulation) in
panel (a), and for a simulation with α = 0 (black). For the simulations, the height of
each histogram bar shows the average and the error bars show the standard deviation
of the number of counts per bin. Inset of (b): M2(t) for the simulations from which the
coloured bands in (a) and filled coloured histogram bars in (b) were obtained, showing
(dashed coloured lines) the periods in the simulation during which interaction matri-
ces were recorded. Panels (c) and (d): heatmaps showing individual i’s probability of
defeating individual j in a pairwise interaction, calculated (c) from the 1994 mountain
goat data, and (d) from the simulations from which the blue band in (a) was obtained
(averaged over the nr = 100 realizations). Grey squares indicate that no interaction
occurred between i and j. Probability values indicated in the colour-bar in the top-right
corner of (d) are applicable to both (c) and (d).
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4.2 Proxies for status in large social groups
In the comparison of our model with animal interaction data shown in section 4.1, we
recorded the simulated interaction matrices starting from an arbitrary initial distribution
of status, S(t0). In principle it is possible, for an arbitrary value of α, to estimate the
{Si} values of the animals in an observed interaction matrix. This would require enough
interaction data to estimate the win probabilities for a sufficient number of pairs of
individuals such that the ratio Si/Sj could be calculated from Eq 1 for these pairs, and
then all {Si} calculated from these ratios. In so doing, one of the {Si} can be set to
an arbitrary value since the dynamics of the model are independent of the value of the
(conserved) average status, S¯, of the system. The data in published animal interaction
matrices (including in Ref. [56]) is insufficient for this purpose, because there are few
pairs of individuals where the win probability p < 1, making it impossible to obtain a
meaningful estimate of {Si}. Given the difficulty of determining statuses of individuals
in the model directly from observed interactions in animal behaviour studies, to compare
our model results with real-world societies we seek a measurable quantity that can be
used as a proxy for societal status in (large) social groups.
4.2.1 Intraspecific body size distributions in social insects
We have reviewed a number of measurable quantities that may serve as proxies for
societal status in non-human animal groups and these are presented in Table S2.2 in
Appendix S2. The only such quantity for which we were able to find data that would
allow one to assign a status value to all individuals in a large group (N ≥ 100) is body
size in social insects. Data collected and reviewed by Gouws and co-workers shows that
body size distributions in social insects are typically right-skewed as opposed to being
normally distributed in non-social insects [63]. The distributions of status formed in
our model are also right-skewed (e.g. see Fig 2), and thus compare favourably with
the body size distributions of social insects. While a more detailed comparison between
simulated status distributions and intraspecific body size distributions in social insects
would be desirable, it is currently problematic because published data either does not
involve individuals from a single colony or does not contain enough information about
the distribution to allow a comparison (specifically, both the variance and skewness of
the proxy distribution are at least required).
While we were unable to find other proxy data for societal status in large groups of
non-human animals, such data does exist for large groups of humans. We thus focus the
remainder of this section on a comparison of the distributions of status produced by our
model to a proxy for societal status (household income) in humans.
4.2.2 Income distributions in humans
In humans, researchers use a theoretical construct called socioeconomic status (SES)
to assign positions to individuals in the social hierarchy. Measurable characteristics such
as income, education, occupation, and wealth are used as single-factor indicators of SES,
or are combined in various ways to obtain composite indicators of SES [64]. When
income data is available, it is considered to be a critical component in determining
SES [65] and, when used as a single-factor indicator of SES, has been found to have
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greater explanatory power (for example, of the relationship between SES and mortality)
than education or occupation [66]. Here, we use household income in Canada and the
USA as a proxy for societal status, because income data is readily available in online
datasets for these two countries (unlike data on wealth) and it is quantitative (unlike
level of education or occupation), making it straightforward to analyze and compare
to our model results. We use household income, rather than personal income, as our
proxy for societal status, in order to avoid artifacts related to income sharing within
a nuclear family unit, such as when a spouse decides not to work or to work below
his or her maximum market value [67]. We thus follow Ref. [66] and many other studies
(e.g. [68–70]) and use household income as an established proxy for socioeconomic status.
Canadian income distribution
Fig 9 shows the (pre-tax) distribution of Canadian household incomes from the 2001
Canadian census [71], as well as a model-generated status distribution for the two-
parameter version of our model (section 2). The simulated system contained N =
312, 513 individuals, which is the number of households in the public-use census sample.
The average status of each individual was set equal to the average household income in
the data, such that S¯ = 55, 536. The model parameter α was set equal to 0, in order
to produce true steady-state status distributions, for convenience in obtaining a fit to
the real data that is independent of observation time, τobs. The parameter δ was then
adjusted until a good fit was obtained with the income data (δ = 0.35 for the plot in
Fig 9). We note that essentially the same status distributions — albeit not steady-state
but only long-lived — can be obtained for (δ, α) values that trace out an equi-M2 line in
δ − α parameter-space (see Fig 6 and part H of Appendix S1).
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Fig 9: Fit of original (two-parameter) model status distribution to Canadian
household income distribution. Simulated distribution (red curve, δ = 0.35 and
α = 0), compared to the distribution of Canadian household incomes from the year 2000
(blue curve). Scaled variance, M2/S¯ = 0.536 and skewness, γ = 1.3 for the simulated
distribution, and M2/S¯ = 0.534 and γ = 1.4 for the proxy distribution. The x-axis of
the main plot has been cut at S = 2.5 × 105. The large peak in the data at $12, 000
(S = 0.12× 105) is most likely due to welfare benefits provided by the government, and
the peak at $120, 000 (S = 1.2× 105) comes from an upper income cutoff applied to the
public-use data by Statistics Canada [72].
The original (two-parameter) version of our model is sufficient to fit the Canadian
household income distribution. This suggests that our very simple model may capture
some essential features of the interactions that give rise to social hierarchy in large groups
of individuals. The two model parameters, δ and α, which determine the outcomes
of pairwise interactions, may be interpreted as societal features since their values are
held constant for all interactions that occur within the society. Particular societies or
species may have different values of one or both of these parameters, leading to different
societal structures represented by the distribution of status. Additional comments about
the potential real-world implications of the time evolution behaviour of the model are
included in section 5.
A shortcoming of the Canadian data is that upper income cutoffs were applied to
the public-use dataset by Statistics Canada, for the purpose of protecting confidentiality
of wealthy individuals. This results in poor data quality at the upper income end of
the Canadian household income distribution. However, there is evidence that income
distributions from many countries have a low-to-middle-income part that is well described
by a distribution function containing an exponential decay, and a separate, high-income
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part that decays more slowly [30,74]. The inset of Fig 9 shows the Canadian household
income distribution and the model-generated status distribution on a log-linear scale,
in order to allow inspection of the large-S tail. The expected slower-than-exponential
decay of the upper-tail is not seen in this data. This motivates us to examine another
dataset in which the distinct low-to-middle and upper income parts of the distribution
are present. We do this for the USA household income distribution in the next section.
USA income distribution
Fig 10a shows United States household income distributions for the years 1990, 2000,
and 2015 [73]. The USA datasets are 1-in-100 national random samples of the population.
Dollar values for each of the three datasets have been adjusted to 1999 values in order to
permit a comparison across time. In these distributions, the presence of an approximately
exponentially-decaying low-to-middle-income part (initial straight-line decrease in the
inset of Fig 10a beginning after the peak at S ≈ 0.25×105 and ending at S ≈ 0.25×106),
separated from a more slowly-decaying high-income tail is visible. The “break” point
between the lower and upper parts of the data is present for all three curves and can
be seen in the inset of Fig 10a at S ≈ 0.25× 106. This break is observed in the income
distributions of many different countries [30,74].
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Fig 10: USA household income distributions and fit of extended model. (a)
USA household income distributions for three different years (indicated in legend). Dollar
values have been converted to 2015 values to allow comparison of the different datasets
[75]. A “break” in the data separating the high-income tail from the low-to-middle part
of the income distribution can be seen in the inset at S ≈ $250, 000 (S = 0.25 × 106).
Upper-income cutoffs have been applied to the American data by the governmental
agency that provided the data, causing the plateau in ln[p(S)] (inset) for the highest
income values. (b) Fit of extended model status distribution to USA household income
distribution. Simulated distribution (red curve) with parameters δ = 0.4, α = 0, η = 3.5,
 = 0.08 compared to the distribution of USA household incomes from the year 2015
(blue curve).
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Fig 10b shows the 2015 USA household income distribution and a simulated distribu-
tion from the extended model. The main plot (linear scale on the y-axis) shows that the
simulated distribution fits well to the low-to-middle income part of the distribution. The
inset (logarithmic scale on the y-axis) shows that the simulated distribution also contains
a break between the low-to-middle and high-income parts of the distribution, mirroring
the break in the data. The value of the parameter η was chosen such that ηS¯ = SB ,
where SB is the location of the “break” point in the data, estimated from the data to be
at $275, 000. Changes to the value of  result in a poorer fit (see Appendix S2, part C).
As expected,  is small, such that only 8% ( = 0.08) of the pairwise interactions that
would not occur according to the threshold criterion do occur. Two alternative ways to
restrict the pairwise interactions between competing individuals that lead to quantita-
tively similar behaviour are described in part E of Appendix S2; for example, a simple,
additional extension to the model that allows all individuals with statuses greater than
ηS¯ to interact with each other shows an improved fit to the proxy data.
Several econophysics studies have found power-law distributions in the high-income
tail of personal income distributions [30, 74]. However, a graphical analysis (Fig 11)
comparing best fits of exponential and power-law distributions to the high-income tails
of the 2000 and 2015 USA household income distributions shows that the household
income data that we use as a proxy for societal status is not consistent with a power-law
distribution but is consistent with an exponential distribution over large ranges. This is
also confirmed by Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for both distribution types. Further details
are provided in Appendix S2 (part D) [76–79].
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Fig 11: Functional form of high-income tail of USA household income dis-
tribution. Power-law (dashed black line) and exponential (solid red line) distributions
with lower and upper bounds on the fitted distribution chosen to correspond to the full
high-income tail. S represents USA household income data in 1999 USD. The curves for
2015 have been shifted down in the plots for better visualization.
The distinct low-to-middle and upper status parts of the data show the presence of
two distinct groups or classes within the society. In the model, these two distinct groups
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emerge when the frequency of interactions between individuals with large differences in
status is reduced. The model thus suggests that societal conditions that limit interactions
between individuals with large differences in societal status may produce or maintain
distinct social classes. Individuals belonging to the upper status class may have a self-
interest in reinforcing such societal conditions in order to preserve their positions in
society. Societies with policies that promote interactions between individuals with large
differences in societal status may have less distinct class structures.
5 Discussion
We have presented a simple winner-loser model of the formation and evolution of
social hierarchy, based solely on interactions (fights) between individuals that result in
the transfer of societal status from the loser of the fight to the winner. We showed that
the model exhibits regions in parameter-space in which the asymptotic distributions
of status produced by the model either show a continuous unimodal behavior or take
on a degenerate form, in which a single individual possesses all of the society’s status.
In the latter case, intermediary distributions are long-lived for small positive values
of the model parameters. Here, “long-lived” refers to quasi-stationarity of the status
distribution, where, over a sufficiently short observation time, the status distribution
remains essentially unchanged. This is quantified through the characteristic time τ2,
which controls the evolution of the system toward the end-state.
Our model thus suggests that there are two fundamental characteristics of status-
determining interactions in a society — the level of intensity of interactions (δ) and
the degree of authoritarianism (α) — that determine both the outcomes of the inter-
actions and whether the society’s structure will be stable or preserved for long times
before undergoing eventual deterioration. These two parameters together with optional
parameters restricting the interactions between individuals control the shape of the (in-
termediary) status distribution, which becomes more unequal (larger variance) as either
α or δ is increased.
In comparing the status distributions produced by simulations of the original (two-
parameter) and extended models with the proxies for societal status in section 4.2, the
parameter α was set equal to 0. However, as shown in Appendix S1 (part H), essentially
the same long-lived status distributions can be obtained for (δ, α) values that trace out
an equi-M2 line in δ − α parameter-space. Starting with a given value of δ and α = 0,
one can locate an equi-M2 line in Fig 6. Then, following the equi-M2 line in the direction
of increasing α, one eventually arrives at the transition between long-lived states and
runaway (where the location of the transition depends on the time over which the society
is observed). If the value of δ of a society can be determined by fitting the model
(with α = 0) to a proxy for the society’s status distribution, then the corresponding
equi-M2 line may provide an indication of the maximum level of authoritarianism for
which essentially the same status distribution can be maintained over a specific time
interval. This maximum level of authoritarianism would be reached when the equi-M2
line intersects with the boundary separating regions II and III for this specific time
interval, see Fig 6 for examples.
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Similarly, the presence of a characteristic time scale controlling the longevity of the
intermediary distributions suggests a limit on the extent to which societal inequality can
increase (e.g., due to societal changes that cause an increase of one or more of the param-
eters) before a runaway deterioration occurs. Whether a real society in fact approaches
the end-state might depend on how this characteristic time scale compares with other
time scales neglected in our model, such as the rate at which the society experiences ex-
ternal perturbations including wars with other societies or major environmental changes,
and internal perturbations related to the effects of birth, death, immigration, and aging
of individuals. For example, in the comparison of the model with agonistic interactions
in animals shown in section 4.1, τ2 ≈ 59 years, significantly longer than the 12-15 year
life expectancy of mountain goats [62], such that births, deaths, maturation of juveniles,
and immigration may change the long-term dynamics of the system in such a way that
it remains far from the end-state predicted by our model.
Extending our original (two-parameter) model by introducing an additional model rule
that adjusts the probability with which individuals interact with one another based on
the differences in their statuses, we can produce stable and long-lived status distributions
which have identifiable low-to-middle and upper status regions. The status distributions
in our extended model show good agreement with the distribution of household incomes
in the USA (see Fig 10b), which we use as a proxy for societal status in large social
groups. This appears to be the first model in which the two-part structure of the proxy
distribution emerges by self-organization based solely on interacting individuals, without
requiring any exogenous influence such as redistribution through taxation. Several anal-
yses of personal income distributions have found that the low-to-middle-income part of
the distribution decays exponentially and that the high-income tail decays like a power-
law [30,74]. Based on these analyses, various econophysics models have been propopsed
with the goal of generating distributions of income with two-part shapes in which the
lower-to-middle part of the income distribution follows an exponential distribution, and
the upper tail follows a power-law distribution [39,80,81]. Among the models that gen-
erate a distribution of income or wealth as a self-organizing process based on interactions
between individuals, several are able to produce either a power-law decay in the upper
tail, or an exponential decay in the lower part of the distribution, but not both. The
status distributions produced by the original (two-parameter) version of our model do
not have two-part structures, and therefore never contain a “break” in the large-S tail
similar to that seen in the insets of Fig 10. But the extended version of our model can
produce two-part structures, where both the regime leading up to and the regime follow-
ing the “break” decay exponentially. Our model thus suggests that societal structures
containing distinct social classes arise when interactions between individuals with large
differences in social status are limited or restricted, as occurs, for example, in residential
segregation in the USA [45,82,83].
A necessary foundation for more advanced studies of social hierarchy is the exploration
of the simplest possible realistic models, including the determination of their limits. This
was the goal of the present article. Future, network-oriented models may incorporate
features such as the histories of interactions between individuals [84–86] and cooperative
behaviours including the formation of coalitions [43, 87–89] and mobbing [90, 91]. Such
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models may provide deeper understanding about the origins and evolution of societal
structures, including the mechanisms responsible for societal destabilization or collapse.
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Appendix S1
S1.A Comparison of simulation results to Ispolatov et al. ana-
lytic solution
In order to demonstrate that the definition of time as t = 2t′/N in the simulation
corresponds to the definition of time in the analytical solution of Eq 2 of the main text,
we show (Fig S1.1) a plot of M2(t) when the parameter α = 0 with time defined as
t = 2t′/N . Each cluster of curves in the figure corresponds to a particular value of the
model parameter δ. Within a single cluster of curves, simulation results are shown for
three different system sizes, N . The red line shows a fit of Eq 4, where the fit parameters
τ1 and c1 are equal to their corresponding analytic values from Eq 2. For example, for
δ = 0.8 and S¯ = 1, the fit parameters are c1 = 4.00 and τ1 = 6.29, whereas Eq 2 gives
cˆ1 = 4 and τˆ1 = 6.25.
Fig S1.1: Evolution of M2(t) for α = 0 and various values of δ (from bottom, δ = 0.1,
0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8). Time is scaled so that t = 2t′/N . Fits are for N = 105. Data
averaged over nr realizations of the simulation.
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S1.B Time evolution of distributions
S1.B.1 Beginning from an egalitarian initial condition
Fig S1.2 shows the time evolution of systems prepared in an “egalitarian” initial con-
dition, in which all individuals have the same initial status of S = 1. Each row in the
figure corresponds to a different value of δ, and each column to an instant in time, with
time increasing from left to right across the subplots. For all values of δ, the system
undergoes an early-time evolution away from the initial condition. When α = 0 (blue
curves), the system arrives at a steady-state in which the distribution of status remains
constant in time. The steady-state distribution is obtained within a time equal to a few
multiples of τˆ1, as expected from Eq 4 of the main text. When α > 0 (green and red
curves), the distribution continues to evolve after the transient period, and approaches
the totalitarian end-state at a rate that depends on δ and α.
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Fig S1.2: Time evolution of distributions for different values of δ, with α = 0 (blue),
α = 0.2 (green), and α = 0.5 (red), starting from an initial condition in which all
individuals have status S = 1 (“egalitarian initial condition”). x-axes in the sub-plots
correspond to status, S, and y-axes to the probability density, p(S). N = 103, nr = 20.
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S1.B.2 Beginning from a uniform initial condition
Figures showing the evolution of the model beginning from a uniform initial condition
are included below, for the same values of δ and α shown in Fig. S1.2. In the uniform
initial condition, the initial status of each individual is chosen randomly from a uniform
distribution with average status S¯ = 1. The time evolution beginning from this initial
condition is qualitatively the same as for the egalitarian initial condition.
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Fig S1.3: Time evolution of distributions for different values of δ, with α = 0 (blue),
α = 0.2 (green), and α = 0.5 (red), starting from an initial condition in which status is
uniformly distributed (“uniform initial condition”). x-axes in the sub-plots correspond
to status, S, and y-axes to the probability density, p(S). N = 103, nr = 20.
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S1.C Behaviour of τ1 and τ2 as a function of system size, N
In order to examine the behaviours of the characteristic times τ1 and τ2 as a function
of system size, N , plots of M2(t) for different system sizes are shown in Fig S1.4. The
parameters controlling the early-time behaviour of M2 (c1 and τ1) remain constant as
system size, N , is increased. The parameters controlling the long-time behaviour of M2
increase linearly with N . For example, for α = 0.5, the values of τ2 extracted from a fit
of Eq 6 are 1.17× 105, 1.18× 106, and 1.21× 107 for system sizes N = 102, 103, and 104,
respectively. Likewise, the parameter c2, which represents the “upper plateau” end-state
value of M2 increases linearly with N in the large-N limit (Eq 5).
Fig S1.4: Evolution of M2(t) for δ = 0.2 and α > 0 (from bottom, α = 0.3, 0.5, 0.6)
for different system sizes N . (a)-(c) different (linear) scales on x and y axes. (d) log-log
scale. Fits are of Eq 6 (red dashed lines) to simulated data.
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S1.D Proof that N2 fights are required to reach end-state when
δ = 1 and α =∞
In order to explore how the long-time behaviour of the evolution of the status distri-
bution depends on system size N , we consider the extreme scenario of a system in which
the higher-status individual in each fight wins with probability p = 1, and in which the
winner of each fight receives all of the loser’s status, leaving the loser with zero status.
This extreme scenario corresponds to δ = 1 and α = ∞. In the model presented in the
main text, δ is strictly less than 1, meaning that no single individual can ever possess all
of the societal status of the system. However, in the following we set δ = 1 in order to
allow the system to obtain (after a finite time and for a finite system size) the end-state
in which a single individual possesses all of the societal status and all other individuals
have zero status. This simplifies the analysis, leading to the proof described below.
The goal of this exercise is to determine the time, τend, required to reach the totali-
tarian end-state beginning from an egalitarian initial condition. To do so, we will work
backwards from the totalitarian end-state, in which a single individual possesses all of
the societal status.
Working backwards from the end-state, we can consider the sequence of events that
were required to arrive at the end-state. The first required event, working backwards,
is a fight between two individuals possessing non-zero status. Since δ = 1, one of these
individuals loses and exits the fight with status equal to zero. The other individual
wins the fight and receives all of the status of the loser, which, added to its pre-fight
status, equals the total status of the system. Therefore, the end-state is preceded by a
configuration of the system in which only two individuals possess non-zero status. The
probability that these two particular individuals are selected to fight each other is the
probability of selecting the first individual OR the second individual AND the probability
of selecting the remaining individual:
ρ2 =
(
1
N
+
1
N
)
1
N − 1 =
2
N(N − 1) . (10)
Continuing to work backwards, in order to obtain the configuration of the system in
which there are two individuals with non-zero status, a preceding configuration having
three individuals with non-zero status is required. The probability that two of these
three individuals are selected to fight is:
ρ3 =
(
3
2
)
2
N(N − 1) . (11)
Following through with this logic, we find ρN =
(
N
2
)
2
N(N−1) . Now, the expected
number of fights that will elapse between the required configuration k and the subsequent
required configuration k − 1 in this sequence is ρ−1k . Therefore, the expected number of
fights to reach the end-state is:
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τ ′end =
N(N − 1)
2
(
1(
2
2
) + 1(3
2
) + 1(4
2
) + . . .+ 1(
N
2
))
= N(N − 1)
N∑
k=2
1
k(k − 1) . (12)
The sum in Eq. 12 approaches 1 for large N , such that τend ≈ N2. The time to reach
the end-state when δ = 1 and α =∞ is therefore τend ≈ 2τ ′end/N = 2N , for large N .
This proof is included as a demonstration of the configurational reasons why the long-
time (approach to the end-state) evolution of the model dynamics increases in proportion
to the system size N .
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S1.E Phenomenology of the time-evolution of status distribu-
tions when α > 0
In this section we provide some additional details about the phenomenology of the
evolution of the status distributions when α > 0.
Fig S1.5a shows a plot of M2(t) for a system with N = 1000, δ = 0.2, and several
values of α.
Fig S1.5: (a) M2(t) on a log-log scale, with four stages of evolution indicated. δ = 0.2
for all curves. (b) Probability p (averaged over preceding 100 fights, considering only
those fights in which S1 > S¯) as a function of time. N = 1000 (a and b) and nr = 10
(a) and nr = 1 (b)
Three distinct stages in the evolution of M2(t) can be identified, as indicated on the
log-log plot of M2(t) shown in S1.5a. First (stage 1), there is a rapid change away from
the initial condition into a distribution similar in shape to the α = 0 (true steady-state)
distribution. This distribution shape is essentially maintained during stage 2, such that
M2(t) changes only very slowly with time. For example the curve corresponding to
α = 0.2 (blue) in Fig S1.5a remains in stage 2 over the time scale of the simulation
(to demonstrate this, distributions corresponding to specific points in time along this
curve are shown in Fig S1.6). The duration of stage 2 decreases with increasing α, as
can be seen in the curve corresponding to α = 0.4 (green) in Fig S1.5a (distributions
corresponding to specific points in time along this curve are shown in Fig S1.7). When α
is increased further, stage 2 essentially disappears (red curve in Fig S1.5a – distributions
corresponding to specific points along this curve are shown in Fig S1.9).
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Fig S1.6: Time evolution of distributions for δ = 0.2, α = 0.2. N = 1000, nr = 10.
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Fig S1.7: Time evolution of distributions for δ = 0.2, α = 0.4. y-axis scale adjusted in
plots for ln[t] = 8 to 11 to allow visualization of large-S range of distribution. N = 1000,
nr = 10. 43
Transitioning from stage 2 to stage 3, the distribution accumulates many individuals
with very low statuses, and several higher-status individuals emerge. Stage 3 then con-
sists of the slow evolution of this highly skewed distribution. A particular characteristic
of stage 3 is that, for fights involving at least one individual who still retains sizeable
status (e.g., S1 > S¯), the probability p→ 1. This is illustrated in Fig S1.5b, in which p
is averaged over the preceding 100 fights, considering only those fights in which S1 > S¯,
giving the quantity 〈p〉S1>S¯ . The fact that 〈p〉S1>S¯ → 1 signifies that the higher-status
individual in any given fight (excluding fights in which neither individual has greater
than average status) is virtually guaranteed to win. For finite values of α > 0, in or-
der for this to occur, there must be a large relative status between the two individuals.
Stage 3 is therefore characterized by a distribution in which the ratio of S2/S1 for any
two randomly-selected individuals is small enough such that 〈p〉S1>S¯ → 1 for fixed α (as
per Eq 1). The large-time decrease in 〈p〉S1>S¯ (e.g. for the red curve corresponding to
α = 0.75 in Fig S1.5b, at ln[t] = 8 to ln[t] = 11) occurs as individuals with S¯ < S < SH
begin to experience decreases in status. Here, SH is the status of the highest-status indi-
vidual. This is illustrated in Fig S1.8, which plots the sum of statuses of all individuals
with S¯ < S < SH as a function of time.
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Fig S1.8: Sum of statuses of all individuals with S¯ < S < SH vs. t, for δ = 0.2 and
α = 0.75. N = 1000, nr = 10.
The transition from stage 3 to the totalitarian end-state involves the decrease in the
sum of statuses shown in Fig S1.8 following the maximum at ln[t] ≈ 7. This shows
that in its evolution toward the end-state, the distribution must pass through a series
of configurations (stage 3) in which there are a number of individuals with higher-than-
average statuses, these individuals having extracted their large statuses from the mass
of very low status individuals that accumulates in the transition from stage 2 to stage 3.
Only after stage 3 has been obtained are the conditions present in which fights between
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high status individuals can lead to the emergence, in the end-state, of a single individual
with status approaching the total status of the system.
In the end-state, SH → NS¯ and M2(t) → c2. The fourth (light blue) curve in Fig
S1.5 corresponds to α = ∞, signifying that the higher-status individual in any fight is
guaranteed to win (several points in Fig S1.5b for which 〈p〉S1>S¯ < 1 for this curve result
from fights in which S1 = S2 due to the egalitarian initial condition). Distributions at
specific points along this curve are shown in Fig S1.10.
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Fig S1.9: Time evolution of distributions for δ = 0.2, α = 0.75. y-axis scale adjusted in
plots for ln[t] = 4 to 11 to allow visualization of large-S range of distribution. N = 1000,
nr = 10. 46
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Fig S1.10: Time evolution of distributions for δ = 0.2, α =∞. y-axis scale adjusted in
plots for ln[t] = 3 to 11 to allow visualization of large-S range of distribution. N = 1000,
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A plot showing the same quantities as in Fig S1.5, but where α is fixed and δ is varied,
is included below for comparison. As can be seen, as δ is increased, the duration time of
stage 2 decreases.
Fig S1.11: (a) M2(t) on a log-log scale. (b) Probability p (averaged over preceding 100
fights, considering only those fights in which S1 > S¯) as a function of time. α = 0.3 for
all curves. N = 1000, nr = 10.
S1.F Proof that a single individual with non-negligible status
remains in the totalitarian end-state
When α > 0, the system approaches an end-state in which a single individual possesses
virtually all of the society’s status and all other individuals have status approaching zero.
An argument that only a single individual with non-negligible status remains in the end-
state (and not, for example, multiple high-status individuals), is as follows.
Consider a large (but finite) system of N individuals. When α > 0, beginning from an
egalitarian initial condition, the system evolves such that there are relatively few indi-
viduals with large status and relatively many individuals with small status (see section
S1.E). Since the average status of the system is constant, we can use it as a reference
point to define “large status” to mean greater than average status, and “small status”
to mean less than average status. The subsequent dynamics can be understood in terms
of two timescales. The first timescale, λ1, sets the time (measured in number of fights)
that transpires, on average, between fights involving the same two particular individu-
als. Since pairs of individuals are picked randomly from among the population, λ1 is
determined by the system size N and remains unchanged as the system evolves.
The second timescale, λ2, relates to the time required for an individual with less than
average status to achieve an upset victory over an individual with greater than average
status. Once the system has evolved to a point in which there are few individuals with
high statuses and many individuals with low statuses, such an upset is the only way
in which an individual with lower than average status can obtain greater than average
status. λ2 is determined by the average probability, 〈pupset〉, with which an upset occurs
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(the smaller 〈pupset〉, the larger λ2). The probability for such an upset to occur (in any
particular fight) is less than 50%, by Eq 1 of the main text. Therefore, fights that involve
one individual with greater than average status and one individual with less than average
status will generally result in a transfer of status from the lower-status individual to the
higher-status individual. This creates a net transfer of status from individuals with lower
than average status to individuals with greater than average status. One outcome of this
net transfer of status is a reduction in 〈pupset〉. Consequently, the timescale λ2 must
increase with time (number of fights).
Since λ1 remains constant whereas λ2 increases as the system evolves, eventually
λ1 dominates the dynamics such that any two particular individuals fight one another
much more frequently than any one particular individual with lower than average status
achieves an upset that transforms it into an individual with greater than average status.
Since fights between any two particular high-status individuals occur with higher fre-
quency than fights in which a low-status individual achieves an upset over a high-status
individual, there is a net flow of the losers of fights between two high-status individuals
into the ranks of those with lower than average status.
The rate at which this net flow of losers occurs increases as λ2 increases, and after
an infinite number of fights (t→∞), only a single individual with greater than average
status remains.
S1.G Technical aspects regarding τ2 extraction and errors
For small values of α, τ2 diverges, such that very long simulations are required in order
to evaluate τ2. In order to simplify matters, we consider a linear expansion of Eq 6 in
the region where τ1  t τ2:
M2 = c1 + (c2 − c1)(1− e−t/τ2) ≈ c1 + c2 − c1
τ2
t. (13)
A linear fit to M2(t) data in the τ1  t  τ2 can then be made, with intercept c1
and slope s = (c2− c1)/τ2. This allows τ2 to be calculated, since c2 is known from Eq 5.
An example is shown in Fig S1.12a. Here, a set of 10 realizations of the simulation
were performed. The plot contains the 10 different M2(t) curves overlayed one top of
each other, with a linear fit (red line) to the combined data for all 10 curves. Fig S1.12b
shows the distribution of residuals. The residuals are skewed, such that large increases
in M2 are more likely than large decreases.
Propagation of errors shows that ∆ ln[N/τ2] ≈ ∆s/s, assuming that ∆s ∆c1 (justi-
fied below). This means that as α is decreased and s approaches 0, it eventually becomes
impossible to obtain a meaningful fitted value of τ2. Following this reasoning, we include
points on the plot of ln[N/τ2] vs. α shown in Fig 7 for values of α for which ∆s/s < 1.
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Since M2(t) has a skewed (non-Normal) distribution of residuals and contains time-
correlations, it is difficult to obtain a meaningful value of ∆s from a regression. We
therefore estimate ∆s using uncorrelated, normally-distributed synthetic data with a
width that is representative of the fluctuations in M2(t). This is done by generating
random data from a Normal distribution with width equal to the average (over all time
points) of the standard deviation taken, at each time t, across the 10 realizations of the
simulation. An example of this synthetic data is shown in Fig S1.12b (black curve). A
least squares fit provides a correct determination of the error on the slope and intercept
of this synthetic data, which we use as estimates for ∆s and ∆c1. In this way, we see
that ∆s ∆c1.
This procedure provides an estimate of the (small α) limit beyond which points cannot
be added to the plot of Fig 7 (obtaining further points would require longer simulation
times that are beyond the scope of this study). The procedure does not provide a
reasonable estimate of error bars for Fig 7. However, ∆ ln[N/τ2] is expected to increase
with decreasing α (since s decreases, while ∆s remains approximately constant), and
this is reflected in increased fluctuations of ln[N/τ2] about the straight black lines in Fig
7 as α decreases.
Fig S1.12: (a) 10 overlaid realizations of M2(t) for δ = 0.2, α = 0.2, N = 100, nr = 10,
and linear fit (red line). (b) Distribution of residuals R = yfit −M2 (blue curve) and
a Normal distribution with width equal to 〈σ(M2(t))〉 of a random variable X (black
curve).
S1.H Equi-σ distributions
Essentially identical distributions can be produced (within a particular simulation
time) for different combinations of the parameters δ and α. This is shown in Fig S1.13,
which plots status distributions generated for three different points in δ − α parameter-
space. The inset to Fig S1.13 shows the distributions with a logarithmic scale on the
y-axis, in order to allow closer inspection of the tails of the distributions. To compare the
shapes of the distributions in Fig S1.13, in addition to visual inspection of the plotted
curves, we use the time-and-realization-averaged standard deviation, 〈σ〉 of the status
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distributions. This is defined as follows: first, we average the standard deviation of the
status distributions over 500 realizations of the simulation, giving us σ(t). Then, we
average σ(t) over a range of time (500 ≤ t ≤ 1000) during which σ(t) is approximately
constant corresponding to the long-lived state. This gives us 〈σ〉. Repeating this proce-
dure for the skewness of the status distributions gives us
〈
µ3/σ
3
〉
, which we also use to
compare the shapes of the distributions in Fig S1.13.
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Fig S1.13: Equi-σ status distributions, obtained at τobs = 1000, for different pairs of
(δ, α) values. Blue curve: 〈σ〉 = 0.733 ± 0.001; green curve: 〈σ〉 = 0.732 ± 0.001; red
curve: 〈σ〉 = 0.732± 0.001. 〈µ3/σ3〉 = 1.46± 0.01 for all three distributions.
The value of 〈σ〉 for the three distributions is the same, within error (caption of Fig
S1.13). The error value used here is the standard deviation of σ(t) taken over the range of
time 500 ≤ t ≤ 1000. Likewise, 〈µ3/σ3〉 is the same, within error, for the three different
distributions. There is, however, one subtle difference between the distributions that can
be seen in Fig S1.13: the value of p(S) at S = 0 becomes systematically larger going
from smaller (larger) to larger (smaller) α (δ). Except for this caveat, Fig S1.13 shows
the existence of sets of (δ, α) points producing essentially identical distributions.
S1.I Determining the location of the transition between regions
II and III of Fig 10
S1.I.1 Using a criterion based on the slope of M2(t)
The location of this transition between regions II and III of Fig 10 depends on the
time, τobs, over which the system is observed (simulated). A simple criterion equates
the onset of runaway with the appearance of a positive slope in the long-time portion of
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M2(t). Whether such a slope is observed in M2(t) depends on the size of the fluctuations
in the simulation data. We ran nr = 25 realizations of the simulation for system size
N = 1000. In order to determine if the system is in the long-lived state for a particular
value of α, we first fit a straight line to M2(t) over a range [t0, τobs], where t0  τ1 such
that M(t0) is on the M2(t) plateau that follows the initial transient evolution away from
the initial (egalitarian) distribution. The transition is considered to have occurred at
the value of α for which the long-time part of the M2(t) curve increases by 2.5% over
the observation (simulation) time τobs. For the choice of N and nr used, this amount
of increase corresponds to approximately 5 times the standard deviation of the residual
R(t) = Mˆ2(t) −M2(t), where Mˆ2(t) is the linear fit, and M2(t) is averaged over the
nr = 25 realizations. Therefore, the distribution is considered to be long-lived over the
interval [t0, τobs] as long as m(τobs−t0) < 0.025b, where m is the slope and b the intercept
of the linear fit.
S1.I.2 Using the Arrhenius relation between τ2 and α
The criterion (see above, section S1.I.1) of a 2.5% increase in M2(t), used to determine
the location of the transition between the long-lived state and runaway, can be written
in terms of Eq 6 as:
M2(τobs) = 1.025c1 ≈ c1 + (c2 − c1)(1− e−τobs/τ2), (14)
where the approximation comes from the assumption that τobs  τ1. Rearranging
Eq. 14 in terms of τobs gives the following relationship:
τobs ≈ −τ2 ln
(
1− 0.025c1
N − 1− c1
)
. (15)
Now, we fix τobs and adjust α until the relationship in Eq. 15 is satisfied. Inserting the
relationships αb = 0.53δ
−1.21 (Fig 8) and Nf0 = δ1.3 (Fig 9) into Eq 7 and rearranging,
we find:
αt ≈ αb
ln[τ2(αt)f0]
≈ 0.53δ
−1.21
ln
[
−τobsδ1.3
N ln
(
1− 0.025c1N−1−c1
)] , (16)
where αt is the location of the transition (as defined by the criterion stated above)
and τ2(αt) is the value of τ2 when α = αt.
A factor of c1 appears twice in Eq. 16. While c1 is in fact a function of δ and α, it
changes slowly with α (Fig 6d). Therefore, we set c1 to be equal to its value when α = 0,
such that c1 = δ/(1− δ) (see Eq 2). With these assumptions in place, Eq. 16 produces
the solid black (τobs = 10
4) and red (τobs = 10
3) curves in Fig 10.
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S1.I.3 N-dependence of αt
The N -dependence of αt is contained within the denominator of the argument of the
logarithm in the denominator of Eq. 16. Fig S1.14 shows a plot of this part of Eq. 16
as a function of N . The plot becomes effectively constant for large N , showing that the
N -dependence of αt vanishes for increasing N such that the location of the transition
between the long-lived state and runaway effectively does not depend on system size.
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Fig S1.14: The part of Eq. 16 containing a dependence on N plotted vs. powers of N ,
and becomes effectively constant at large N .
S1.I.4 Alternative location of the transition between regions II and III ac-
cording to Arrhenius relation
In some physical systems governed by an Arrhenius relation, the location of the opera-
tional transition between two regimes is taken by the researcher to be at the value of the
control parameter (usually temperature, in physical systems) for which the transition
rate τ is equal to the measurement time τm. This is the case in the blocking transition
of superparamagnetism, for example [50].
We could use this reasoning to locate the transition between the long-lived state and
runaway in our model at a value of α = α∗t for which τ2 = τobs. Re-arranging Eq. 7 and
substituting in the relationships for αb and Nf0, we find:
α∗t =
αb
ln[τobsf0]
=
0.53δ−1.21
ln
[
1.03δ1.3τobs
N
] . (17)
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In a physical experiment, the criterion for setting the location of the operational tran-
sition is primarily determined by the measurement type. For some measurement types,
it may be appropriate or natural to set the location of the transition at a value of the
control parameter analogous to α∗t . In our system, this would correspond to identify-
ing the transition between the long-lived state and runaway at a value of α for which
M2 = M2(t = τ2) ≈ c2(1 − 1/e). This represents a significant evolution of the system
toward the totalitarian end-state, which is not suitable for our purpose. Rather, our goal
is to determine the value of α for which, on the scale of the observation time considered,
the long-lived state plateau value of M2 is lost and a noticeable increase in M2(t) is
observed. We therefore place the location of the transition at αt.
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S1.J Additional details about evolution of extended model dis-
tributions
The figures in this section are included to show how the status distributions produced
by the extended model (presented in section 2.1 of the main text) evolve in time. In
the upper left panel of each figure, the evolution of M2(t) on a log-log scale is shown.
The status distributions are shown at various points in time (indicated within the plots)
in the remaining panels. For each figure, the simulation had system size N = 1000,
and the results are averaged over nr = 5 realizations of the simulation. The simulation
parameters δ = 0.2, η = 1.0, and  = 0.1 are fixed for all figures, and the parameter α is
varied.
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Fig S1.15: Time evolution of distributions for δ = 0.2, α = 0.0, η = 1.0,  = 0.1.
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Fig S1.16: Time evolution of distributions for δ = 0.2, α = 0.2, η = 1.0,  = 0.1.
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Fig S1.17: Time evolution of distributions for δ = 0.2, α = 0.4, η = 1.0,  = 0.1.
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Fig S1.18: Time evolution of distributions for δ = 0.2, α = 0.75, η = 1.0,  = 0.1.
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Appendix S2
S2.A Dependence of interaction probabilities on rank for moun-
tain goats in study of Coˆte´ (2000)
In section 4.1 of the main text, we make use of data from the study of Coˆte´ [56]
on agonistic interactions in female mountain goats collected during four consecutive
summers. To compare results from our simulations with the mountain goat data across
multiple years, we consider only those individual’s in Coˆte´’s datasets that are present
in all four years. This is a subset of the full dataset, since some mountain goats enter
the society (e.g. by ageing to the age of three years old) and leave the society (e.g. by
dying) from one year to the next.
To examine whether the mountain goats in our subset taken from Coˆte´’s data had a
tendency to interact more frequently with those close in rank versus those far away in
rank, we used the same approach as was used in Fig 6 of Ref. [56]. That is, for each
individual, we considered the percentage of the individual’s interactions with the 10
individuals closest in rank and with the 10 individuals furthest in rank. For the N = 26
individuals present in all 4 years of the study, there was no bias toward interacting with
individuals close in rank or far in rank. Results are presented in the following table.
Table S2.1: Tendency of individuals to interact with other individuals close or far in
rank in N = 26 subset from Coˆte´’s mountain goat data. Each entry in columns 2-4 shows
the percentage (averaged over the N = 26 individuals) of an individual’s interactions that
were against (column 2) one of the 10 closest ranked other individuals; (column 3) one
of the 10 furthest ranked other individuals; or (column 4) an individual not belonging
to the group of 10 closest to or 10 furthest from the individual in rank. Each error value
shows the standard deviation of the percentage of interactions.
Year 10 closest 10 furthest Other
1994 0.39 ± 0.09 0.4 ± 0.1 0.2 ± 0.1
1995 0.4 ± 0.2 0.4 ± 0.1 0.2 ± 0.1
1996 0.4 ± 0.1 0.4 ± 0.1 0.2 ± 0.1
1997 0.4 ± 0.1 0.4 ± 0.2 0.19 ± 0.09
Similar results are obtained when considering the 5 closest and 5 furthest individuals
in rank and the 15 closest and 15 furthest individuals in rank.
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S2.B Measurable quantities that may serve as proxies for status
in non-human animals
Table S2.2: Measurable quantities that are relevant to the estimation of status proxies
Agonistic
behaviour
(fights)
• Agonistic interactions (fights) between pairs of individuals are
observed in many studies and used to assign a rank to
individuals in a dominance hierarchy. These can include
physical aggressions, physical and non-physical (e.g. vocal,
eye-contact) intimidations, and subordinations [1, 19,52,92].
• Typically, an interaction matrix is constructed, with one row
and column for each observed individual, where the entries are
the numbers of times that individual i has defeated individual j
in a fight [26,54,55].
• A ranking of the individuals in the study can be obtained by
re-arranging the rows of the interaction matrix to satisfy a
criterion (e.g. minimizing the sum of entries below the
diagonal) [93] or by calculating a score from the interaction
matrix (e.g. Davids Score) [58].
• Other studies make use of the sequence of interactions to rank
individuals using a score that evolves each time an individual
has an interaction. With these methods, the rank-ordering of
the individuals can change as more interactions
occur [26,54,55,94].
Affiliative
behaviours
(grooming in
primates)
• The grooming time that an individual receives correlates with
hierarchical position (grooming is directed up the
hierarchy) [95,96], and may be given as a service in exchange
for support in agonistic interactions or tolerance [97,98].
However, individuals have limited grooming-time to give, and
compete to groom higher-ranking individuals [99]. Therefore,
grooming-time received by a high-status individual may
underestimate her status.
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Physical
characteristics
• Whereas animals living in small groups may be able to assess
the fighting abilities of one another by remembering the history
of past interactions, when these same animals live in large
groups (e.g. of N ≈ 100 [100]), in which the role of individual
recognition is reduced and where it is unlikely that every
individual has interacted with every other individual, they may
instead use physical characteristics (so-called ”status signals”)
to communicate and assess fighting ability.
• In some cases, the status signal can change on a short
time-scale, such as following a promotion or demotion in rank,
such that it may signal the current fighting ability of the
individual to others (e.g. the intensity of red colour in geladas
and mandrills).
• Examples: Black facial marks in wasps [101,102]; comb size in
hens [100]; dark plumage throat-patch size in male
sparrows [103]; red chest-patch colour in male geladas [104]; red
face colour in male mandrills [107].
Biochemical
concentrations
(blood and saliva
chemistry)
• Hormone and neurotransmitter concentrations are related to
position in the dominance hierarchy and the dominance
behaviour of the individual [1, 108,109]. However, the
relationship between biochemical concentrations and
hierarchical rank is complicated in that it depends on social
context. For example:
• High ranking individuals may have elevated levels of
glucocorticoid (stress hormone), but for different reasons than
low-ranking individuals with the same elevated level of
glucocorticoid [40,42].
• Testosterone concentration correlates with rank in the
dominance hierarchy (higher-ranking individuals have higher
concentrations of testosterone), but only in periods of societal
instability [107,108].
• Serotonin concentration correlates with rank, but is very
sensitive to the presence of subordinates [110].
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Body size (such
as weight or
length)
• Correlated with dominance rank and ability to win agonistic
encounters in social insects, including ants, bees, and
wasps [92,101], crustaceans [111], fish [112,113], and
reptiles [114], although there are confounding factors such as
age [115] and past fighting experience [17,116].
• Less strongly related to dominance rank in more ”complex”
animals such as mammals [56,117,118].
Age
• Dominance rank is correlated with age in many
species [115,119,120], although confounding factors include past
fighting experience and body size [115].
• In many primates, the alpha eventually loses his/her position to
a younger challenger [105,106,121,122], such that a simple
linear relationship between age and dominance hierarchy rank is
not accurate.
Preferential
access to food
• Access to high quality food is correlated with dominance rank
in many species, for example: salmon [123], caribou [124],
deer [125], goats [126], macaques [127], chimpanzees [128], and
baboons [4].
• Dominance not correlated with access to food in carrion
crows [129].
Mating
opportunities
and reproduction
• Access to reproductive opportunities generally correlates with
position in the dominance hierarchy [130,131], however the
relationship can be non-linear. For example, high ranking
female baboons have been found to have more miscarriages and
a higher rate of infertility [132], beta-male chimpanzees in some
groups have much fewer copulations than lower-ranking
males [133], and low-ranking male monkeys with affiliative
relationships with females can have greater reproductive success
than expected given their rank [1].
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S2.C Sensitivity of fit to USA income data to change in param-
eter 
Fig 15 of the main text shows a fit of the extended model to the USA household income
distribution. The parameter η is set such that ηS¯ = SB , where SB is the “break point”
in the data. The parameter  in Fig 15 was chosen to be equal to 0.08 in order to obtain
a good fit to the income data. Two figures are included below to show how decreasing
(Fig S2.1) or increasing (Fig S2.2) the value of  affects the fit to the proxy data.
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Fig S2.1: Fit of extended model (η = 3.5,  = 0.06) to 2015 USA household income
data.
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Fig S2.2: Fit of extended model (η = 3.5,  = 0.1) to 2015 USA household income
data.
S2.D High-income tails of USA household income distributions
In Fig 16 of the main text, fits of exponential and power-law distributions to the
high-income tail of the 2000 and 2015 USA household income distributions were shown.
Normalized with respect to the boundaries Sl and Sh, the probability density function,
p(S), of the power-law distribution is:
p(S) =
S1−γl − S1−γh
γ − 1 S
−γ , (18)
and that of the exponential distribution is:
p(S) =
e(Sl−S)/T
T (1− e(Sl−Sh)/T ) , (19)
where the parameters γ and T are determined by maximum likelihood estimation
using the data within the range [Sl, Sh] [77]. Two additional figures showing different
[Sl, Sh] ranges are included below. As for Fig 16 of the main text, the black dashed line
shows the power-law fit and the solid red line shows the exponential fit. The 2015 curves
have been shifted down in the plots for better visualization.
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Fig S2.3: Power-law (dashed black line) and exponential (solid red line) distributions
with Sl and Sh chosen to correspond to the high-income tail, excluding the highest-
income points. For the fits to the 2015 data shown in this figure, the choice of Sh
resulted in the exclusion of the 15 largest data points. For the fits to the 2000 data
shown in this figure, the choice of Sh resulted in the exclusion of the two largest data
points. Exclusion of the highest-income data points is justified because high-income
cutoffs have been artificially applied to the USA data by the governmental agency that
provided it, for the purpose of protecting confidentiality. S represents USA household
income data in 1999 USD.
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Fig S2.4: Power-law (dashed black line) and exponential (solid red line) distributions
with Sl and Sh chosen to correspond approximately to the latter part of the high-income
tail. Graphical analysis shows that, at best, a power-law can only fit segments of the
high-income tail. S represents USA household income data in 1999 USD.
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S2.D.1 Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test
A Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test was used to evaluate whether the high-income tail
of the USA household income distribution is consistent with a power-law distribution
(Eq 18) or with an exponential distribution (Eq 19). The term “theoretical distribution”
is used below to refer to the distribution (either power-law or exponential) that the real
data is compared to in the statistical test.
The KS test relies on the “KS distance”, which is the largest distance between the
cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the theoretical distribution (with specified
parameters) and the empirical cumulative distribution function, FN , determined directly
from the data as follows:
FN (x) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
I[−∞,x](Xi), (20)
where I[−∞,x](Xi) is the indicator function, which is equal to 1 if Xi ≤ x and 0
otherwise, and N is the number of data points in the dataset. The 2015 USA household
income dataset is a weighted dataset, such that every data point represents a particular
number of people in the overall population. For this dataset, the weighted empirical
cumulative distribution function [76] was used:
Fw(x) =
1∑
i wi
N∑
i=1
wiI[−∞,x](Xi), (21)
where wi is the weight assigned to the ith data point.
Since the parameters γ (power-law distribution) and T (exponential distribution) are
unknown, they are estimated from the data using maximum likelihood estimation for
the unweighted 2000 dataset and weighted maximum likelihood estimation for the 2015
dataset [78].
The KS distance, Ddata, between the empirical CDF (FN or Fw) and the CDF of the
theoretical distribution is compared to a distribution of KS distances determined from
synthetic datasets. To obtain the latter distribution of KS distances, the following steps
are repeated many times: 1) a sample of synthetic data containing the same number of
data points as the real data is drawn from the theoretical distribution; 2) the parameters
of the theoretical distribution are re-estimated from the synthetic data, in order to avoid
biases that arise if this re-estimation is not performed [79]; 3) the KS distance, Dsynth, is
determined from the empirical CDF of the synthetic data and the theoretical distribution
with re-estimated parameters.
If the real data is consistent with the theoretical distribution, Ddata should be smaller
than a significant fraction of the set of {Dsynth}. The fraction of {Dsynth} that is larger
than Ddata is the p-value given by the test. We consider a p-value greater than 0.1 to
be evidence of compatibility with the theoretical distribution. In other words, with a
p-value greater than 0.1, there is not enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis that
the real data comes from the theoretical distribution.
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A KS test showed that the high-income tail of the 2015 USA household income data
is only compatible (p-value > 0.1) with an exponential distribution within particular
ranges [Sl, Sh] within the high-income tail, the largest of which is $700, 000 to $1, 700, 000
($492, 800 to $1, 196, 800 in 1999 USD), and that the high-income tail is not compatible
with a power-law for any of the ranges tested. The KS test for the 2000 USA household
data also shows that the data is only compatible with an exponential distribution within
particular ranges, the largest being from $800, 000 to the largest income value in the
dataset ($1, 668, 400), and that the high-income tail is not compatible with a power-law
for any of the ranges tested.
S2.E Alternative “extended” models that pre-suppose a two-
class structure
S2.E.1 Addition to extended model to allow fights between high-status in-
dividuals
In the extended model presented in section 2.1 of the main text, individuals at the
top-end of the status distribution are separated by large amounts of status, typically
greater than the amount ηS¯. These high-status individuals are therefore prevented from
fighting with each other by the first condition (S1 − S2 > ηS¯) of the extended model.
This excludes many fights between high-status “dominant” individuals and higher-than-
average status “challengers”, whereas such dominant-challenger fights are important and
common in real dominance hierarchies [40,42,43]. In order to allow high-status individ-
uals to fight each other more frequently, we introduce a third condition to the extended
model, such that the fight occurs if the statuses of both potential competitors are greater
than the threshold amount ηS¯ (equivalently, if S2 > ηS¯, since S1 >= S2). Under this
modification to the extended model, the fight occurs if S1 − S2 ≤ ηS¯ OR S2 > ηS¯ OR
r ≤ , where r is a random number between 0 and 1. The additional condition S2 > ηS¯,
pre-supposes a two-class structure a priori. The status distributions produced by this 3-
condition extended model have large-S tails that decay exponentially over the full extent
of the tail, unlike those produced by the 2-condition extended model presented in section
2.1 of the main text, which show a cutoff at very high values of S (see Fig 12f of the
main text). The status distributions of the 3-condition model therefore show improved
fits to the proxy data, as can be seen in Fig S2.5.
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Fig S2.5: Fit of 3-condition extended model status distribution (red curve) to the 2015
USA household income distribution (blue curve). Simulation parameters: δ = 0.4, α = 0,
η = 3.5,  = 0.08.
S2.E.2 Combining two independently simulated status distributions
Here, we have used the original (two-parameter) model presented in section 2 of the
main text and simulated two separate populations with different N and S¯. The com-
bination of the two simulated status distribution provides a good fit to the American
household income distribution. This is shown in Fig S2.6, where the blue curve is the
American household income distribution data for the year 2015, the red and green curves
represent the two independently-simulated status distributions, and the cyan curve shows
the combination of the two simulated distributions. The simulation that produced the
green curve contained N1 = 0.1Ndat individuals, where Ndat = 1,226,728 is the number
of households in the dataset. For this first simulated society, S¯1 = 225, 000. The simula-
tion that produced the red curve contained N2 = 0.9Ndat individuals with S¯2 = 64, 445.
S¯1 and S¯2 were chosen so that the total status of the two simulated systems S¯1N1 +S¯2N2
was equal to the total household income reported in the dataset.
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Fig S2.6: Fit of simulated distribution to USA data. Cyan curve is the combination of
red and green distributions. For red curve, N = 0.9Ndat, S¯ = 64, 445, and δ = 0.4; for
green curve, N = 0.1Ndat, S¯ = 225, 000, and δ = 0.35. α = 0 for both red and green
curves.
As shown in Fig S2.6, the American household income data is well-represented by
the combination of the status distributions of (i) a simulated system with a relatively
small number of individuals having a relatively high average status, and (ii) a simulated
system with a relatively large number of individuals having a relatively modest average
status. This approach differs from those presented in sections 2.1 of the main text and
section S2.E.1, by assuming that the society consists of two separate groups for which the
members of each group engage in status-determining interactions amongst themselves,
but for which there are no cross-group interactions. The extended model presented in
section 2.1 of the main text makes no such assumptions.
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